The probate court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 700.1302(c) & 700.1303(1)(a); In re Lager Estate; A conservator’s fiduciary duty; MCL 700.5416; In re Conservatorship of Brody; Validity of a settlement; MCR 5.407; Duress; Clement v. Buckley Mercantile Co.; Liparoto Constr., Inc. v. General Shale Brick, Inc.; Farm Credit Servs. of MI’s Heartland, PCA v. Weldon; Hungerman v. McCord Gasket Corp.; Principle that there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in state court civil cases; McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC; Curtis v. Loether; Equitable nature of actions to set aside a deed; Moran v. Moran; Adams v. Adams; Judicial disqualification; In re MKK; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court held that the probate court did not err by releasing a notice of lis pendens and placing a lien in favor of petitioner-conservator and guardian on the property at issue. She asked the probate court to invalidate a transfer of farm property from their mother (Doris) to herself and respondent on the basis that Doris was incompetent at the time of the purported “transfer, that there was not good consideration paid for the property, and that” respondent exercised undue influence over Doris. It entered a stipulated order settling all claims, including that the conservatorship agreed to sell respondent the property for cash and a mortgage and interest-free note securing the balance due and payable upon either his or Doris’s death, or a determination that the money was needed for her care. When respondent refused to sign the mortgage and note, the probate court entered a lien on the property in favor of the conservatorship, released the notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner, and ordered that she quitclaim the property to respondent subject to the lien. On appeal, the court rejected respondent’s argument that “the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because its order affected a property interest purportedly transferred before the conservatorship came into effect[,]” noting he provided no case law or other rationale for why this dispute would not fall squarely within its jurisdiction. Further, petitioner had a fiduciary duty to invoke its jurisdiction. It also rejected his claim that the settlement was invalid because petitioner, “as Doris’s daughter, would benefit from it at the time of Doris’s death as one of her intestate heirs.” Because Doris’s GAL and court-appointed attorney “consented to the settlement and the trial court approved the settlement as submitted, even assuming [petitioner] might benefit at some future date as a result of the preservation of Doris’s assets, the prohibition” in MCR 5.407 was not implicated. The court next rejected his duress claim, noting he “was represented by counsel at the time he entered into the settlement agreement, which undercuts any viable claim of duress.” Finally, it held that the probate court did not violate his constitutional rights by denying him a jury trial and his motion seeking the probate court judge’s disqualification. He had no constitutional right to a jury trial and did “not establish disqualifying judicial bias.” Affirmed.