Whether the alleged contract was barred by statute of frauds (SOF); MCL 556.108; Guzorek v. Williams; The doctrine of part performance; Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Unjust enrichment; Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit; Pleading inconsistent claims; AFSCME Council 25 v. Faust Pub. Library; Statutory conversion; Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc.; Fraud; City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children’s Funded Trust; Dutkiewicz v. Bartkowiak; MCR 2.112(B)(1); Equitable relief

The court held that the purported contract was not barred by the SOF, and that plaintiff adequately pled an unjust enrichment claim. But he failed to state a claim for statutory conversion, and summary disposition for defendant was appropriate in that regard. While it was unclear why the trial court dismissed the fraud claim, it was clearly error because plaintiff sufficiently pled such a claim, and there were unresolved material factual issues. Finally, he conceded on appeal that “equitable relief” was not a separate cause of action and thus, it was appropriately dismissed. The case arose from an alleged loan that plaintiff made to defendant to redeem the property at issue. The court assumed for purposes of the opinion that the money given to defendant “was not intended as a gift, but rather was given pursuant to an oral agreement.” According to the complaint, the parties “orally agreed that plaintiff would provide defendant with money to redeem the property, and in return defendant would either repay plaintiff within one year or transfer the property to him. The complaint further alleged that defendant refused to repay defendant or transfer the property to him, thereby breaching the contract.” The issue was whether the SOF barred this purported contract. MCL 556.108 did “not bar that portion of the parties’ agreement in which defendant agreed to repay plaintiff within one year, as this statute deals solely with agreements for real property. The trial court appeared to recognize this initially, but then inexplicably dismissed the entire count. This was error.” But the question remained whether the SOF barred the portion of their “agreement in which defendant agreed to transfer the property to plaintiff if she failed to repay him.” Plaintiff contended that this portion was valid based on Guzorek. The court held “that the doctrine of part performance removed plaintiff’s claim as alleged in his complaint from the [SOF]. . . . In reliance on the parties’ oral agreement that defendant would transfer the property to plaintiff if she were unable to repay him, plaintiff gave defendant the money to redeem the property. Plaintiff therefore performed his obligation under the contract in reliance on the parties’ oral contract. Because ‘it would be fraud upon’ plaintiff to now allow defendant ‘to repudiate the contract,’ ‘equity will regard the contract as removed from the operation of the’” SOF. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.