Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams; Jurisdiction; Alleged defect in the plea-taking proceedings; MCR 3.971(B); In re Pederson; In re Ferranti; Due process requirement that the waiver of fundamental rights be knowing, understanding, & voluntary; In re Wangler; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; In re Hicks/Brown; Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Medina; In re White; In re Moss Minors; Requirement that the trial court adequately state its findings as to the child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(1); In re Trejo Minors; MCR 3.977(I)(1)

The court held that respondent-mother did not establish that the trial court’s adjudicatory error as to MCR 3.971(B) was outcome determinative, and that § (c)(i) supported terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to the child. It also concluded that a preponderance of the evidence showed that terminating his rights was in the child’s best interests, and rejected his claim that the trial court did not adequately state its findings in this regard. Thus, the court affirmed the order terminating their parental rights. The mother argued that her no contest plea “was not knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily given because the trial court failed to advise her that her plea could be used as evidence to terminate her parental rights as required by MCR 3.971(B)(4).” However, the court noted that, as in Pederson, the trial court did not completely fail to advise her of her rights. She “was advised of the rights that she was waiving by pleading no contest, but was not advised that the no contest plea could be used later to terminate her parental rights.” Also as in Pederson, she did not show “that the trial court’s failure to advise her that her plea could be used as evidence in a later proceeding to terminate her parental rights was outcome-determinative.” There was no indication that it relied on her no contest plea when it later found that statutory grounds for termination existed. Rather, her testimony about “her history of substance abuse, homelessness, domestic violence, and mental health concerns provided sufficient basis from which the trial court could conclude that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and would not be rectified within a reasonable time.” As to the father and § (c)(i), the child was removed due to “respondents’ substance abuse, mental instability, domestic violence, and unstable housing. The record” indicated that for over two years, the father “failed to comply with and benefit from the services offered to him. [He] failed to participate in substance abuse treatment, tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, failed to contact the caseworkers, failed to participate in counseling, and failed to benefit from the anger management program in which he participated, continuing to be the subject of numerous police reports of domestic violence and drug activity.” In addition, he regularly missed visitation and did not secure stable housing.