The Michigan Election Law (MCL 168.1 et seq.); Certification of ballot language pursuant to MCL 168.646a(2); The Home Rule Cities Act (MCL 117.1 et seq.); MCL 117.22; Interaction between MCL 168.646a(2) & MCL 117.22; Entitlement to a writ of mandamus; Coalition for a Safer Detroit v. Detroit City Clerk; A “ministerial” act; Berry v. Garrett; Statutory interpretation; Use of different terms; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n; The in pari materia rule; Summer v. Southfield Bd. of Educ.; Pavlov v. Community Emergency Med. Servs., Inc.; “Shall”; Oakland Cnty. v. Michigan

The court held that the first deadline in MCL 168.646a(2) was met, and that plaintiff-city council established the necessary elements for a writ of mandamus compelling defendant-city clerk (Buffa) to act. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order denying plaintiff a writ of mandamus and ordered Buffa to immediately certify the ballot language at issue to defendant-county clerk pursuant to the statute. After plaintiff approved a ballot proposal to amend the city’s charter to reduce the mayor’s term limit from five to three, the mayor vetoed it, and plaintiff overrode the veto. The case involved the interaction of MCL 168.646a(2) and MCL 117.22. The court concluded “that the Governor’s approval under MCL 117.22 is not the certification to the local clerk that is required by 4:00 p.m. on the twelfth Tuesday before the election required by MCL 168.646a(2).” The two statutes do not reference each other, and nothing in their plain language implied “that the Governor’s approval under MCL 117.22 is the ‘certification’ contemplated by MCL 168.646a(2). Rather, the statutes use different terms; MCL 117.22 refers to the Governor’s ‘approv[al]’ of an amendment to a city charter, while MCL 168.646a(2) speaks of certification.” The court also noted that “while MCL 168.646a(2) speaks of very specific deadlines for certain acts to be taken by, MCL 117.22 only states that the Governor’s approval must come ‘before [a proposal’s] submission to the electors . . . .’” The Governor’s approval complied with MCL 117.22. The court found no merit in Buffa’s argument “that because the Governor’s approval did not come until after 4:00 p.m. on [8/11/20], MCL 168.646a(2) was not satisfied and she had no choice but to refrain from submitting the proposal to the Macomb County Clerk. Rather, the proposal was ‘certified’ to Buffa no later than” 7/20/20, when plaintiff’s resolution overriding the veto was certified. Once plaintiff “submitted the resolution to Buffa, plaintiff certified the proposal to Buffa.” As to the elements for a writ of mandamus, “Buffa had a clear legal duty to certify the ballot language to the” county clerk by 8/13/20, and plaintiff had a right to performance of this duty. Further, the court concluded that the act was ministerial as MCL 168.646a(2) “leaves no room for discretion.” Finally, it found that no other legal or equitable remedy but mandamus was available.