42 USC § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments; The Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA); MCL 28.725(10)–(12); MCL 28.733(f), 28.734(1), & 28.735(1); MCL 28.722(g) & 28.725(1); MCL 28.728(1) & (2); MCL 28.728a; MCL 28.722(b)(iii); Qualified immunity; Courtright v. City of Battle Creek; Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal; False arrest; Sykes v. Anderson; Whether the omissions & misstatements in the warrant requests were knowing, deliberate, or reckless; United States v. Bonds; Mills v. Barnard; Newman v. Township of Hamburg; Wesley v. Campbell; Hill v. McIntyre; United States v. Lyons; Whether the law was “clearly established”; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd; White v. Pauly; Bunkley v. City of Detroit; Malicious prosecution; Johnson v. Moseley; Gregory v. City of Louisville; Coffey v. Carroll; Defamation; Paul v. Davis; The “stigma-plus” test; Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police; Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe; Burgos Vega v. Lantz (2d Cir.); Schepers v. Commissioner (7th Cir.); Brown v. Montoya (10th Cir.); Municipal liability; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.; North v. Cuyahoga Cnty. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Epps v. Lauderdale Cnty., TN (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Board of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed in part the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss in this § 1983 action arising from plaintiff-Hart’s arrest and imprisonment for not registering as a sex offender when he was no longer required to do so. But it reversed as to his defamation claims against three defendants. After Michigan narrowed the crimes covered by SORA, Hart, who had been a juvenile offender, was no longer considered a “sex offender.” But he was twice arrested on SORA warrants and he spent 19 months in prison, despite his new status. After he was released, he sued defendants for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation. The district court denied their motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court found that the “only reasonable inference to be drawn from” the warrant requests was that “Hart was an ‘offender’ subject to SORA’s requirements. He was not—a material fact that was omitted from both warrant requests.” Defendants argued that they were not “reckless” because they were entitled to rely on the Michigan State Police and its database. But the court noted that reasonable officers would have been aware that the database can contain errors “and seeing apparent mistakes in Hart’s record,” should have followed the statutory directive to discover “whether ‘the legal requirements for obtaining a warrant [were] satisfied, . . . including whether Hart’s failure to register was excused by his homelessness.” Thus, it affirmed as to the false arrest claims. It also affirmed as to his malicious prosecution claims, concluding that further record development was needed. On the defamation claim, the court applied the “stigma-plus” test to determine whether a state action had violated Hart’s procedural due process rights. It joined other circuits by holding that “wrongful classification as a sex offender implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest under” this test. But Hart was still required to identify a “procedural flaw” and the court was unable to determine whether he received due process or whether his right was clearly established. This claim was remanded as to some defendants but dismissed as to three others. Lastly, the court found that, “[i]f the district court determines that the municipalities failed to take reasonable steps to forestall wrongful listings, liability may exist for Municipal Defendants.”