Dispute involving personal protection insurance benefits under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); MCL 500.3105(1); Whether evidence of third-party payments is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of a healthcare provider’s charges; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); MCL 500.3157-3159; Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Bronson Methodist Hosp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; McGill v. Auto Ass’n of MI; Hofmann v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Munson Med. Ctr. v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Johnson v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co.; Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp.; Mercy Mt. Clemens Corp. v. Auto Club Ins Ass’n; Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Discovery; Cruz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Holding that evidence of third-party payments may be relevant to the issue of whether plaintiff-healthcare provider’s charges were reasonable, the court reversed the denial of defendant-insurer’s motion in limine and remanded. It declined to consider plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, noting that such an award would be premature. Defendant paid 80% of plaintiff’s charges for medical services it provided to defendant’s insured, but refused to pay the remainder on the basis that the total amount billed was unreasonable. Plaintiff sued, seeking payment of the balance. The trial court denied defendant’s motion in limine, in which it contended that evidence of third-party payments was relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s charges. On appeal, the court held that “nothing in the plain language of § 3107(1)(a) or § 3157 precludes consideration of third-party payments when determining a no-fault insurer’s liability for reasonable charges.” It then rejected plaintiff’s argument that, even if this evidence was relevant, it should be excluded because it was not discoverable under §§ 3158 and 3159. “While this information may not be obtainable directly from [plaintiff] under §§ 3158 and 3159, nothing in the No-Fault Act prevents [defendant] from introducing publicly available data with the proper foundation.” The court concluded that “evidence regarding third-party payments may be relevant and admissible for purposes of assessing reasonableness under § 3107(1)(a) and § 3157. And the trial court’s blanket exclusion of this evidence constituted an error of law amounting to an abuse of discretion.” The court made clear that it did “not hold as a matter of law that the evidence offered by [defendant was] relevant and admissible; rather,” it reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded “for the trial court to make the determination in the first instance under the proper legal framework.” The trial court had “not yet considered the relevance of the specific data in question to the particular healthcare charges at issue in this case that were billed in 2016,” or addressed the expert’s particular methodologies in analyzing that data. “The record must also be developed with respect to the precise cost information [defendant] seeks to discover and whether the cost information meets the standards in Bronson.” Finally, under the circumstances, the court did not consider whether the trial court erred by denying plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under MCL 500.3148.