Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. VanderVliet; Relevance; People v. Sabin (After Remand); MRE 401; People v. Orr; MRE 403; People v. McGhee; Harmless error; MCL 769.26; People v. Williams; People v. Mateo; People v. Denson; Exclusion of evidence on the basis it was irrelevant; MRE 402; Materiality; People v. Crawford; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree premeditated murder; People v. Bennett; First-degree felony murder; People v. Smith; Unlawful imprisonment; “Restrain”; Identity; People v. Fairey; Aiding & abetting; People v. Izarraras-Placante; Prosecutorial misconduct

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence or in excluding evidence on the basis it was irrelevant, that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions, and rejecting his prosecutorial misconduct claim, the court affirmed. He was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Before her death, defendant was charged with CSC against the victim (D). On appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony from D’s ex-boyfriend, B, about how defendant had sexually assaulted D a number of times. The prosecution offered the testimony to show his motive for killing D. “Proof of motive is a proper, non-character purpose.” The testimony was also relevant to whether he killed or aided and abetted another man in killing D. While defendant asserted that there was no proper purpose because other evidence showed he admitted to having sex with D and she told a school counselor about his actions, “the fact that other relevant and admissible evidence may establish the same motive, does not negate the fact that the challenged evidence is also proffered for a proper purpose and is also relevant. Instead, the presence of other, less prejudicial evidence supporting a defendant’s motive must be evaluated under MRE 403’s balancing test.” The court disagreed with his contention that the probative force of B’s testimony was essentially identical to that of other evidence. The counselor and the lead detective in the CSC case did not offer details about what D had disclosed, and defendant told his mother and the police that his sex with D was consensual. B’s testimony showed that it was not consensual, and his testimony “was necessary to show the true nature of the sexual contact . . . .” The nonconsensual nature of the sexual relationship “was highly probative of his motive to kill her.” Further, the probative value of the testimony “was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [B’s] testimony was brief and was not as detailed and salacious as” defendant claimed. The court added that, even if B’s testimony was erroneously admitted, the untainted evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.