Quiet title; Boundary line dispute; Acquiescence; Sackett v. Atyeo; Walters v. Snyder; Killips v. Mannisto; Intention to deed to a marked boundary; Maes v. Olmsted; Daley v. Gruber; Trespass; Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.; Waiver; Grant v. AAA MI/WI, Inc. (On Remand)

The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that the disputed boundary was established by acquiescence arising from intent to deed to a marked boundary line, that defendants-Litchfield failed to show any error in the dismissal of their trespass counterclaim, and that plaintiff waived her argument on cross-appeal as to the boundary line location. After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title to the disputed boundary line area. It found that defendant-Hale had expressed the intent “to sell plaintiff the property up to the point two feet west of the well as the eastern boundary of plaintiff’s property, that Hale never obtained a survey to ensure the accuracy of the legal description in the land contract or her perceived boundary line, and that the fence installed by Hale shortly after the sale also served to mark this boundary line.” As a result, the trial court determined that the eastern boundary line of plaintiff’s property was “established by acquiescence arising from the intention to deed to a marked boundary.” While the Litchfields argued that there was “a complete failure of proof” given Hale’s testimony, they ignored the record evidence. There was trial testimony “that Hale showed plaintiff the eastern boundary line at the time of the transaction and that this line was marked by reference to the old well and by stakes located in the northeast and southeast sections of the property purchased by plaintiff. There was also testimony that Hale affirmatively represented to plaintiff that this was the eastern boundary line.” It was the trial court’s responsibility to resolve “conflicting testimony as to whether Hale had intended to convey to a marked boundary[,]” and the court concluded that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. To the extent the Litchfields asserted that there was not a common grantor because Hale, due to a foreclosure, did not directly convey their property to them, they ignored the fact that she once owned both parcels, that both plaintiff’s and their respective chains of title were “thus traceable to Hale, and that Hale is the individual who was alleged to have intended to deed to a marked boundary line.” The Supreme Court in Maes “treated similar circumstances as sufficient to satisfy the common grantor requirement.” Affirmed.