Constitutionality of Michigan’s parole eligibility statutes; The Legislature’s authority to provide criminal penalties; Const. 1963, art. 4, § 45; People v. Hegwood; The judiciary’s authority to impose sentences & administer the sentencing statutes; MCL 769.1(1); Individualized sentencing; People v. Lockridge; People v. Milbourn; Penalty for carjacking; MCL 750.529a(1); Effect of prior felonies; MCL 769.12(1)(b); Principle that there is no entitlement to parole; MCL 791.235; Jones v. Department of Corrs.; People v. Idziak; “Disciplinary time”; MCL 791.233c; MCL 800.34(5)(a); People v. Grant; Fourth-offense offender; MCL 769.12(4)(b); Parole eligibility; MCL 791.233(1)(d); MCL 791.234(2), (7), & (8); People v. Moore; People v. Merriweather; Effect of a parolable life sentence; People v. Johnson; People v. Carson; Due process; Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams; Washington v. Glucksberg; Hurst v. Department of Corrs. Parole Bd.; Greenholtz v. Inmates of the NE Penal & Corr. Complex; Glover v. Parole Bd.; Equal protection; People v. James; People v. Haynes; People v. Conat; People v. Groff; Hawkins v. Department of Corrs.; McGinnis v. Royster; Alvarez v. Straub (ED MI); Ughbanks v. Armstrong; People v. Nowak; Cruel or unusual punishment; Principle that a sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively proportionate & a proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual; People v. Bowling

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendants-state and governor in this case concerning Michigan’s parole eligibility statutes. After his convictions and sentences for various offenses, plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. He challenged the constitutionality of certain “parole eligibility statutes because prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are not eligible for parole consideration until they have served their minimum term in contrast to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, who are eligible for parole after serving 10 or 15 years, and, if not paroled, discharged, or deceased, every 5 years thereafter.” He claimed these statutes violated his due process and equal protection rights, and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. On appeal, the court rejected his due process argument, noting that because he had “no constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled before his valid sentence” expired, the trial court properly granted summary disposition of this claim. It also rejected his contention that the parole-eligibility statutes violated equal protection. “Assuming that criminal defendants sentenced to life imprisonment and those sentenced to a term of years are similarly-situated,” it held that “‘the Legislature could rationally conclude that it is appropriate to require a prisoner to serve the minimum term before being eligible for parole.’” Finally, the court concluded that because plaintiff had no right to parole, “the fact that he must serve his 25-year minimum sentence before he becomes parole eligible is not cruel or unusual punishment.” Affirmed.