Gross negligence claim arising from a traffic stop arrest; Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Beals v. Michigan; MCL 691.1407(2)(c); Oliver v. Smith; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); Tarlea v. Crabtree; Kindl v. City of Berkley (6th Cir.); Kostrzewa v. City of Troy (6th Cir.); Distinguishing VanVorous v. Burmeister; Collateral estoppel based on federal court decisions; Taylor v. Sturgell; Law of the case doctrine; Grievance Adm’r v. Lopatin

Rejecting defendants-officers’ argument that they were entitled to governmental immunity on the basis their conduct was not grossly negligent as a matter of law, the court affirmed the trial court’s partial denial of their summary disposition motion. They contended plaintiff was “collaterally estopped by the decisions in his federal court action from relitigating the issue whether he suffered any physical injury from” handcuffing during his arrest. The trial court agreed with them “on this specific point and ruled that the issue whether there was an injury resulting from the handcuffing itself was precluded from further litigation” by the Sixth Circuit’s decision. But the federal decision did “not mean that plaintiff cannot bring any form of gross negligence claim based on the circumstances of his arrest.” Defendants did not cite any case law suggesting that a plaintiff’s inability to “show gross negligence on the basis of overly tight handcuffs” renders a plaintiff unable as a matter of law to establish “gross negligence on the basis of other actions and inactions involved in the arrest. Plaintiff submitted evidence that he suffered a physical injury from the totality of the circumstances that included having his handcuffed wrists pulled up behind him; being placed in the back of the police vehicle in an awkward, twisted position with his hands raised up to the middle of his back; and having his complaints of pain and discomfort ignored for 45 minutes to an hour. Although the Sixth Circuit determined that he suffered no physical injury from the handcuffing alone,” he was alleging “gross negligence on the basis of the totality of defendants’ conduct and, specifically, from how he was placed into the police vehicle. There was no determination in the federal court that plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury at all from the entire incident.” Thus, defendants failed to show that the trial court erred in its collateral estoppel ruling. Further, the court found that material questions of fact existed and reasonable minds could differ about whether they “were grossly negligent when they placed plaintiff into the police vehicle and allegedly caused him to suffer injuries that included a slipped disc and pinched nerve in his neck or upper spine,” noting that Kindl and Kostrzewa illustrated gross negligence may be shown “based on a combination of actions and inactions by police officers with respect to an individual in custody[.]”