Whether the DHHS was obligated to provide reunification services; In re Moss Minors; In re Rood; MCR 3.977(E)(1)-(4); Jurisdiction over the children; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g), (i), & (j); In re HRC; Doubt about an outcome; People v. Wolfe; Assessment of the witnesses’ credibility; Matter of Loyd; Deference to the trial court; Beason v. Beason; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Jones

The court held that the DHHS was not obligated to provide reunification services, and the trial court did not clearly err when it determined “that the children came within its jurisdiction and that reasonable efforts had been made to avoid removal.” Also, it did not clearly err in finding that § (j) was established, or in determining that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent challenged the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). At the time the petition was filed, she “had been living on charity for several months and those funds were about to be terminated. Although the children were apparently being clothed and fed, respondent had not used the time to devise any kind of long-term plan, obtain new employment or an alternative source of income, or find stable housing. Rather, respondent was abusing drugs, one of which might have been pursuant to an expired medical marijuana card, but the other was certainly not a substance respondent could plausibly claim she might have believed to be legal or safe. Respondent was evicted from the hotel for repeated complaints of noise and possible prostitution.” While the latter was not confirmed in any way, the “eviction was at least some evidence that the hotel did not consider her conduct, whatever it was, to be benign. Importantly, there would have been no plausible way respondent could have engaged in any of the above activities outside the presence of the children. Although respondent obviously did not have complete control over all of her circumstances, she certainly had a choice whether to engage in drug abuse or possible prostitution.” The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court erred by finding a preponderance of evidence that respondent was able to provide an environment for the children that was at least safe while she sought an environment that was more stable, but instead neglected to do so.” When the trial court assumed jurisdiction, “there was sufficient evidence to conclude that respondent had not provided proper care and custody for the children and that there existed a likelihood of continuing harm to” them. Affirmed.