Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re White; In re Ellis; In re Williams; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Moss Minors; In re Schadler; In re LE; In re Trejo Minors; In re Terry

Holding that § (c)(i) existed, that the trial court expended reasonable efforts to reunite respondent-mother with her children, and that termination was in their best interests, the court affirmed. The trial court entered the initial dispositional order nearly two years before it entered the final order terminating her parental rights. The children came into the DHHS’s “care on the basis of respondent’s admissions that financial and mental instability prevented her from providing proper care to” them. As part of her treatment plan ordered by the trial court, she “was to participate in mental health treatment and obtain housing and employment.” At the time of the termination hearing, she “admitted she had not obtained housing and was living with an unnamed friend.” This was consistent with her “pattern throughout the proceedings of living, temporarily, with friends or other individuals for short periods of time. Respondent believed she would be able to obtain housing within one or two months after an unnamed family friend completed eviction proceedings against the occupants of a house the friend would then rent to respondent. Similarly, despite claiming to be employed at various points throughout the proceedings,” she failed to provide the DHHS “or her caseworker with verification of her employment status or a legal source of income.” Finally, she “testified that she was undergoing therapy for her mental health issues and had been prescribed medication that calmed her. But respondent did not provide any verification of her participation in these services, nor had” her case worker been able to contact her therapist and obtain verification or records as to her treatment. Considering the evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to determine that she “had not completed or benefited from services and that the conditions that led to the children being placed in care continued to exist.” It was also reasonable for it to determine “there was not a reasonable likelihood that respondent would be able to rectify these conditions in a reasonable time.” Her treatment plan required her to provide random drug screens; yet the record showed that she “failed to provide the majority of these screens and she specifically failed to provide any screens during the extended period of the termination hearing.” Also, at least four drug screens she provided tested positive for cocaine. Thus, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer her substance abuse was not under control. Coupled with the minimal evidence she provided as to “her ability to find housing, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that there was not a reasonable likelihood respondent would be able to rectify the conditions that brought the children into care within a reasonable amount of time.”