e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 73867
Opinion Date : 09/17/2020
e-Journal Date : 09/21/2020
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : In re Knight
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Tukel and Boonstra; Concurrence – Letica
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Issues:

Reinstatement of gun rights after a felony conviction; MCL 28.424(4)(b)(iii); Relevance of petitioner’s parole; People v. Clark; Probation violation; People v. Hendrick; Jurisdiction; Whether the prosecution had standing; Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ.; MCL 49.153; “Aggrieved party”; MCNA Ins. Co. v. Department of Tech., Mgmt. & Budget; Whether the prosecution was an interested party; Effect of the trial court’s decision to restore petitioner’s gun rights on his legal status under MCL 750.224f; Presumption the Legislature is aware of & considered the effect on all existing statutes in enacting new laws; Walen v. Department of Corr.; The adversarial system of adjudication; Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc.; United States v. Sineneng-Smith

Summary

Holding that (1) respondent-prosecution had standing and was an aggrieved party in this case in which petitioner was granted reinstatement of his gun rights after a felony conviction, and (2) he failed to meet the requirements for reinstatement, the court reversed the order granting reinstatement and remanded for entry of an order denying his petition. He pled guilty in 2001 to arson of woods and prairies. Respondent argued that the trial court erred in restoring his gun rights. Petitioner argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because respondent did not have standing and was not an aggrieved party. The court agreed with respondent and disagreed with petitioner. While he was correct that “prosecutors are not even referenced in the firearms rights restoration statute, MCL 28.424[,]” the court noted that “standing does not require that a statute identify a litigant as an interested party.” It concluded that in light of “the strong presumption that proceedings will generally take place in an adversarial system, and given that MCL 49.153 facially applies to prosecuting attorneys being involved in firearms rights restoration cases, as such cases involve civil ‘applications and motions’ in which the state is ‘an interested party,’ we find nothing in the statutory language which would support reading the statute to so radically depart from the ordinary and expected functioning of adversarial proceedings.” Absent a clear statutory statement, the court could not find that the Legislature intended this result. Respondent was also an interested party because the trial court’s decision “directly affected petitioner’s legal status under MCL 750.224f[.]” Further, it was an aggrieved party for the same reasons. As to the merits, the court determined that the conditions of petitioner’s “parole were not initially imposed ‘for the violation [of law] resulting in the prohibition.’” He was paroled after he was sentenced to imprisonment for violating probation, not for the arson. Thus, under the circumstances, the only relevant inquiry was “whether petitioner complied with ‘all conditions of probation,’ not with whether he complied with conditions of parole.” Given that he conceded he did not complete probation, he was ineligible for restoration of his firearms rights under MCL 28.424(4)(b)(iii).

Full PDF Opinion