Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Roper; People v. Nowack; People v. Kanaan; CSC IV; MCL 750.520e; “Physically helpless”; MCL 750.520a(m); People v. Unger; Consensual sexual contact; People v. Waltonen

Finding that there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the victim was physically helpless at the time of sexual contact, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC IV conviction. Having testified to sexual contact with the victim, his sole element at issue was whether she was physically helpless at the time. Defendant contended that the only evidence supporting such a conclusion “was her testimony that she drank so much that she had no memory of the incident the following day, and that the victim’s next-day memory loss does nothing to provide that she was incapacitated the night before.” However, he erred “by ignoring evidence from which rational triers of fact might conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was physically helpless at the time of the sexual contact, including evidence of the victim’s inability to act or communicate on the night of the incident and defendant’s statement to” Deputy P that she had passed out drunk. The court held that “a jury could reasonably conclude that the victim was physically helpless when taken to bed, that her condition was not simply the result of falling asleep, that she remained in this state of physical helplessness for the next several hours, and that defendant knew this when he initiated sexual contact. While the victim’s memory loss may not prove that the victim was unconscious, asleep, or physically unable to communicate at the time of sexual contact, a rational jury could have considered the victim’s blackout as further evidence of her degree of inebriation.” In addition, “[a] jury may infer consciousness of guilt from evidence of lying or deception.” She noticed “several bruises and bites on her body after the incident that she did not remember having before the incident and that she reported and showed to the investigating officer. When questioned about this by the investigating officer, defendant mentioned responsibility only for the marks on the victim’s neck.” Although P “acknowledged that the bruising on the victim’s breasts could have resulted from efforts to move her upstairs and put her into her bed, the marks on the victim’s shoulder and thigh went unexplained.” The court believed “it possible that a reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant was being evasive or untruthful when he admitted responsibility for only some of the marks discovered by the victim and that the unexplained bruising resulted from defendant’s manipulation of the victim’s unresponsive body during sexual conduct.”