Dispute over the validity of a condo development; Joinder as a necessary party; MCR 2.205; MCR 3.411(H); Mason Cnty. v. Department of Cmty. Health; Skurski v. Gurski; Rockwood v. Hugg; Effect of misjoinder; MCR 2.207; Establishment of a condo project under the Condominium Act (MCL 559.101 et seq.); MCL 559.104(1) & 172(1); “Condo unit”; MCL 559.104(3); “Common elements”; MCL 559.103(7), 160, & 163; Compliance with the master deed, bylaws, & rules & regulations; MCL 559.165 & 206(1); Tuscany Grove Ass’n v. Peraino; Alteration of condo documents; MCL 559.147 & 190; Expenses; MCL 559.169; Easement; Michigan Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc.; Standing; MCL 450.2221; Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Intervention of right; MCR 2.209(A)(3); Permissive intervention; MCR 2.209(B); Timing; Kuhlgert v. Michigan State Univ.; Dean v. Department of Corrs.; WA Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. Department of Pub. Health; School Dist. of Ferndale v. Royal Oak Twp. Sch. Dist. No. 8; Karrip v. Cannon Twp.; Jurisdiction; Wayne Cnty. Chief Executive v. Governor; Altman v. Nelson; Colonial Vill. Townhouse Coop v. City of Riverview; Workers’ Comp. Agency Dir. v. MacDonald’s Indus. Prods., Inc.; Krohn v. Saginaw; Void ab initio; Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA; Quality Mkt. v. Detroit Bd. of Zoning Appeal; Declaratory judgment; MCR 2.605; UAW v. Central MI Univ. Trs.

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant-condo association’s motion to intervene, but did not err by denying appellant-township’s motion. It also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare any portion of the condo development void ab initio, but had jurisdiction over defendants’ other claims. Plaintiff-developer sued defendants-owners seeking to recover possession of one of their three units by forfeiture of the parties’ land contract for nonpayment. Defendants countersued alleging trespass and constructive eviction during the construction of phase II of the project. The trial court entered an order removing their units from the development, granting them an easement over the common elements, and ordering them to pay the developer’s attorney fees. It also denied the township’s and association’s motions to intervene. On appeal, the court agreed with the association that it was a necessary party, noting that, “contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, the [a]ssociation had a ‘real interest in the litigation,’” and was “a party whose presence was required to grant complete relief in the determination of” defendants’ counterclaims. Considering its “rights to the common areas over which [defendants] were granted an easement, as well as [its] interests in the enforcement of the condominium documents and the Condominium Act against all co-owners, including” defendants, the association was “a party ‘having such interests in the subject matter of an action that their presence in the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief.’” As such, it “qualified as a necessary party that should have been joined to the case.” In addition, there was no merit to defendants’ standing argument. However, "given the township’s earlier involvement in the case, its clear knowledge of the issues in dispute in the main action, its ‘hands off approach’ and efforts to be dismissed from the case, and its failure to file a motion to intervene until after entry of the judgment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying” its motion. Finally, the court found that the trial court had jurisdiction over defendants’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Condominium Act. It was also “not persuaded” by the association’s contention that monetary damages were necessarily defendants’ only possible remedy. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.