Employment discrimination based on race; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; MCL 37.2202; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; 42 USC § 2000e-2; Hecht v. National Heritage Acads., Inc.; Direct evidence; Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; Circumstantial evidence; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; Prima facie case; Lytle v. Malady (On Rehearing); Town v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.; Retaliation; MCL 37.2701(a); Garg v. Macomb Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs.; Causation; Debano-Griffin v. Lake Cnty.; Coincidence in time; West v. General Motors Corp.

Holding that plaintiff-former corrections officer did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether her race was a determining factor in defendant-DOC’s termination decision, and that her retaliation claim was also properly dismissed, the court affirmed summary disposition for the DOC. It first determined that the affidavit on which she relied did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. While the affiant stated that he was in a meeting “where instructions were given to write plaintiff up ‘over any work-rule violation[,]’” the court found that this was not evidence requiring a conclusion she “was targeted because she was African-American. The fact that she was African American was not raised in that affidavit. Plaintiff may have been targeted for scrutiny because she was considered a poor employee or unsafe employee who posed a security risk to the prison.” As to circumstantial evidence, the DOC proffered a nondiscriminatory explanation for terminating her, including that the motivating factors “were that she was a probationary employee who had been disciplined for two major infractions” (inappropriate computer usage and a gate incident) and that she “received a verbal warning for discussing her menstruation, in addition to receiving an unsatisfactory rating for her 12-month performance evaluation.” The court concluded that she did not create a triable issue of fact that these proffered reasons for her discharge “were a mere pretext for race discrimination.” As to her retaliation claim, the issue was causation. She asserted that “near the time when her 12-month performance evaluation was coming due, she asked Captain [D] if her review was completed. When he said that it was not ready, she told him that she believed she was being discriminated against and that was the reason for the delay.” She then filed an internal complaint “claiming that she was being discriminated against because of her gender and race.” She received her unsatisfactory performance evaluation the next day. But “a mere coincidence in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is not sufficient—standing alone—to establish a retaliation claim.” Plaintiff did not show that D even knew she had filed the complaint, and the evaluation was actually due when she received it.