Slip & fall after boarding a bus; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); The motor vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; “Negligent operation” of a motor vehicle; Seldon v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp.; Chandler v. Muskegon Cnty.; Martin v. Rapid Inter-Urban Transit P’ship; Effect of a Supreme Court order; DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Sudden jerks or jolts in stopping to let off & take on passengers & in starting; Sherman v. Flint Trolley Coach; Ottinger v. Detroit United Ry.; Selman v. Detroit; Elements of a negligence claim; Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prod. Corp.; Moning v. Alfono; Blackwell v. Franchi; Principle that carriers of passengers for hire are held to the exercise of the highest degree of care & skill & diligence practically consistent with the efficient use & operation of the mode of transportation adopted; Moore v. Saginaw, T & HR Co.; Trent v. Pontiac Transp. Co.; Takacs v. Detroit United Ry.; Wood v. Detroit; Whether governmental immunity is an affirmative defense; Mack v. Detroit

While the court concluded that the bus at issue was being operated as a motor vehicle at the time plaintiff slipped and fell, it held that he did not “establish a genuine issue of material fact that his injuries arose from the negligent operation of the bus” and thus, he failed to meet MCL 691.1405’s requirements. As a result, the trial court erred in denying defendant-SMART’s motion for partial summary disposition based on governmental immunity. The court first concluded on appeal that the bus “was being operated as a motor vehicle because it was being driven as it provided transportation services to the public, specifically driving away from the curb after picking up plaintiff and his wife, when plaintiff allegedly fell as the bus suddenly accelerated while plaintiff was standing on a wet and slippery portion of the bus floor.” The issue then became whether the bus was negligently operated. The court found that the issue before it was “whether negligence can be shown by the sudden start in combination with the presence of the wet and slippery floor hazard where plaintiff” alleged that those circumstances combined caused his fall. As in Selman, there was no evidence that defendant-Lewis (the bus driver) or SMART knew about the wet and slippery area of floor before plaintiff fell or that it “had been wet and slippery for such a length of time that Lewis or SMART should have had notice or knowledge of its existence.” Thus, the trial court erred in “presuming a question of fact regarding SMART’s negligence solely from the existence of the wet condition and plaintiff’s fall.” Further, while the trial court relied on Ottinger, the court found that case distinguishable. It concluded that “plaintiff’s failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Lewis or SMART knew or should have known about the wet condition was fatal to” his claim even though common carriers are held to a higher standard of care. As to his contention that Lewis should have known because it was his duty to know, the cases on which he relied, Wood and Trent, were distinguishable. Further, his argument that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense failed in light of Mack. Reversed and remanded.