Termination based on release or consent; MCL 710.29(7); Adjudication as a court ward pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b) of the Juvenile Code (MCL 712A.1 et seq.); “Statement to Accompany Release”; MCL 710.29(6); Validity of a release or consent executed in accordance with the law at the time of execution; MCR 3.801(B); Principle that a parent may execute a release before either a judge or a referee; MCL 710.29(1); Requirement that a release be accompanied by a verified statement containing certain information prescribed by statute & signed by the parent; Whether the release was knowingly & voluntarily made; In re Burns; Requirement that the trial court enter a termination order upon the execution of the release; MCL 710.29(8); Principle that a parent’s change of heart alone is not a ground to set aside a release that is otherwise knowingly & voluntarily made after proper advice of rights is given; In re Curran

The court held that the trial court did not err by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to her child. The child was adjudicated a court ward. A supplemental petition was later filed to terminate respondent’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, she elected to release her parental rights and signed a release along with a “Statement to Accompany Release.” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by terminating her rights because it failed to ensure that her decision to release her rights was knowingly and voluntarily made and because there was no evidence to support its determination that the release was in the child’s best interests. “The trial court advised [her] of the nature of her parental rights and informed her that by executing the release, she would be voluntarily and permanently relinquishing those rights.” She indicated that she “understood the nature of the proceedings, that she wanted to ‘[r]elease [her] rights,’ and that she had an opportunity to speak with her attorney.” The trial court specifically asked her “whether she was signing the release knowingly and voluntarily and she clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative.” Her release was valid “because it was ‘executed in accordance with the law at the time of execution.’” Further, the trial court complied with the best interests requirement “by specifically stating that the release was ‘in the best interest of the child at this time.’” She failed to identify “any facts or circumstances indicating that the trial court’s determination was incorrect.” Affirmed.