Setting aside a default & default judgment of divorce (JOD); Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. Waterbury Headers Corp.; Shawl v. Spence Bros., Inc.; MCR 3.210(B)(3) & (6)(a); Good cause; Koy v. Koy; Order to attend a settlement conference; MCR 2.401(F)(1); MCR 2.401(G)(1); “Manifest injustice”; Culpable negligence; Factual findings; Rettig v. Rettig; MCR 3.210(B)(5); Applicability of Harvey v. Harvey; Sparks v. Sparks; Custody & parenting time orders & judgments; MCL 722.28; Shade v. Wright; Kessler v. Kessler; Best interest factors; MCL 722.23; Spires v. Bergman; MCL 722.27a(1) & (3); Spousal support; Loutts v. Loutts; Olson v. Olson; Myland v. Myland; Child support; Stallworth v. Stallworth; Reed v. Reed; Voluntary unexercised ability to earn; Ghidotti v. Barber

The court affirmed the trial court’s decisions to deny defendant-ex-husband’s motion to set aside the default and the default JOD. But it vacated the portions of the default JOD as to the “distribution of marital property, custody, parenting time, spousal support, and child support” and remanded for the trial court to “make the required factual findings and conclusions of law” as to these issues. It noted that the trial court must comply with MCR 3.210(B)(5) on remand. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it first found that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the motor vehicle accident was not a reasonable excuse to set aside the” default. The 10/19 settlement conference was the second one “that defendant had failed to attend in a timely manner. Defendant missed the [7/19] settlement conference because he claimed that he had suffered a concussion from a head injury sustained while riding his bicycle the night before the settlement conference. Although the trial court was unsure whether defendant’s claim was a ruse, and although defendant failed to attend the hearing on the motion to set aside the [7/19] default, the trial court granted” his motion. As to the 10/19 settlement conference, he was already late when he was in the car accident he claimed caused his failure to attend. Although his attorney was present, “the trial court had specifically ordered defendant to attend the settlement conference.” Moreover, because he “had once worked as a trial attorney, it reasonably follows that he was aware of the importance of complying with the trial court’s directives.” Thus, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to set aside the 10/19 default. Additionally, although he “moved to set aside the default judgment within the requisite 21 days and the judgment results in ongoing liability,” the court held that a totality of circumstances supported the trial court’s denial of that motion as well. But remand was required for the trial court to make factual findings on several issues.