Adjudication orders; In re BZ; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Principle that how a parent treats one child is probative of how the parent may treat other children; In re LaFrance; The procedural phases of child protective proceedings; In re Ferranti; An “unavailable” witness; MRE 804(a); Admissibility of “former testimony”; MRE 804(b)(1); People v. Farquharson; People v. Duncan; MRE 804(a)(4); “Mental infirmity”; Credibility assessments

In these consolidated appeals of adjudication orders as to his daughters (SN and SS), the court found no error in the trial court’s admission of SN’s preliminary exam testimony in a related criminal case under MRE 804(b)(1), and held that it did not clearly err in finding that jurisdiction existed under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). He argued that the trial court erred in determining that SN was “unavailable” to testify in the child protective proceedings due to mental illness. But the DHHS presented testimony that SN “had cut herself, had developed a viable plan to commit suicide, and had been hospitalized to prevent her from committing suicide.” A mental health therapist (P) who treated her testified that SN “was extremely traumatized whenever she was asked to discuss respondent-father’s actions towards her. Simply learning about the filing of child-protection proceedings caused [her] to suffer a severe mental-health breakdown and the child was hospitalized for a second time due to self-harming and suicidal ideations.” P testified that SN was diagnosed with PTSD and major-depressive disorder, and expressed concern that if SN had to testify about respondent again, she would relapse. The court held that these facts were sufficient to find that SN “was ‘unavailable’ for purposes of MRE 804.” In addition, it rejected his claim that “her testimony was not admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) because [he] did not have ‘an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.’” It noted that he was represented by counsel who cross-examined SN at the preliminary exam, and that respondent’s motive to develop her “testimony in the criminal case was ‘similar’ to his motive to develop that testimony in” this case. As to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the evidence indicated that SN “suffered severe emotional harm as a result of” sexual abuse by respondent. The court was not left with a firm conviction the referee made a mistake in concluding that respondent’s “home environment was one of cruelty, neglect, criminality, or depravity, and that it was an unfit place for” SN to live. It further held that the “trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect to exercise jurisdiction over SS.” It noted that both SN and “his stepdaughter testified that he sexually assaulted them,” testimony the trial court found credible. Affirmed.