Attorney fees & costs; Pirgu v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n; Smith v. Khouri; The Federal Odometer Act (49 USC § 32701 et seq.); Nabors v. Auto Sports Unlimited, Inc. (ED MI); The fee-shifting provision; § 32710(b); Spoliation of evidence; Brenner v. Kolk; Sanction of an adverse inference; Damages; Grace v. Grace

Holding that the trial court did not sufficiently adhere to the Smith and Pirgu framework, the court vacated the attorney fee award to plaintiff and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount of fees in accordance with case law. It further concluded that he was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in litigating his fee petition under the Federal Odometer Act. Thus, on remand, “the trial court should include any such reasonable fees and costs” in determining the appropriate award amount. The court found that the trial court’s analysis on the attorney fee issue was cursory. It “stated that an hourly rate of $350 was reasonable but did not explain how it arrived at that figure. The trial court was required to begin its analysis by determining the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” The court determined that plaintiff “presented evidence supporting his request for a $400 hourly fee for his principal attorney, . . . including the 2017 economics of law practice survey of the State Bar of Michigan,” his attorney’s affidavit, and a consumer attorney’s testimony. In addition, the trial court had “to multiply the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended.” Plaintiff’s proffered billing invoices indicated “63.1 hours of billable time were expended; the trial court stated that 40 hours were reasonably expended but failed to explain how it arrived at this figure.” Further, after deciding a baseline figure, it “failed to address most of the other factors that should be considered in determining whether an upward or downward adjustment was appropriate. . . . Other than tersely asserting that the case was not novel and difficult, the trial court did not address the remaining factors.” Further, there was no “indication that the trial court considered the remedial nature of the legislation involved” here. Given its “failure to adhere to the appropriate framework for determining a reasonable attorney fee,” the court vacated the attorney fee award and remanded “to determine the appropriate amount of the attorney fee award in conformity with” the case law discussed in the opinion. It also found that “defendant’s suggestion that alternative grounds existed to affirm the trial court’s attorney fee award” was contrary to the case law. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.