Sentencing; Resentencing a defendant convicted of a murder committed when he was a juvenile; Miller v Alabama; People v Snow; Ineffective assistance at resentencing

The court held that the trial court properly analyzed the considerations for sentencing a juvenile based on MCL 769.25, as discussed in Miller and Snow. Defendant-Wilson did not show that any of the findings of fact were clearly erroneous, and the sentence was not an abuse of discretion. Also, counsel’s decision not to orally argue the contents of the sentencing memo did not constitute ineffective assistance. He was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and felony-firearm for crimes committed when he was 17. He appealed his convictions and his sentence. The court affirmed his “convictions, but remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to consider age-related factors before sentencing Wilson.” On remand, he was resentenced to concurrent terms of 35 to 60 years for felony murder, 225 to 600 months for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and 2-year terms for his “felony-firearm convictions, to be served consecutively to the other convictions.” He argued that the trial court abused its discretion by resentencing him to the same minimum 35-year minimum term for felony murder it had imposed before remand. He asserted that it did not comprehensively consider distinctive factors related to his youth, arguing that it “failed to grapple with the question of ‘whether the [his] actions represented "transient immaturity" or "irreparable corruption,"’ and that the court should have considered his psychological state in addressing this question.” But he did not argue that its “factual findings were erroneous. The actions cited by the trial court indicated Wilson’s active and calculated involvement—ensuring that [the victim] had money, ensuring that [a codefendant] was armed and his appearance obscured, and offering encouragement. The trial court distinguished impulsiveness and the failure to appreciate risk and consequences associated with youth, noting that Wilson’s actions were ‘well thought out’ and evidenced a ‘disregard’ for life and consequences.” Thus, the trial court properly considered the first Miller factor, “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” The court also found no error in the trial court’s “analysis of Wilson’s family and home environment in relationship to his youth[,]” or in its findings related to the circumstances of the homicide offense. The trial court also properly considered “whether the defendant might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth[.]” Finally, it discussed the final Miller factor, “the possibility of rehabilitation.” Affirmed.