Double jeopardy; People v Lett; Whether a mistrial was manifestly necessary; Continuance alternative

Concluding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion and that its reasoning was sound, the court affirmed its denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and remanded for retrial. He was charged with CSC I and II. The trial court declared a mistrial after an amended offer of proof as to a defense expert’s (Dr. T) testimony, which the prosecution asserted went far beyond the scope of its expert’s (Dr. S) expected testimony and addressed topics on which she was not qualified to testify. While it was undisputed jeopardy had attached, the closer question was whether the mistrial “was manifestly necessary.” The court determined that given “defendant’s late disclosure of [T’s] expected testimony, the trial court should be afforded at least a minimum amount of deference in this case. In fact, it is at least arguable that a significant amount of deference should be afforded to the trial court’s decision for the simple fact that neither it nor the prosecution were to blame for the mistrial in this case.” While defendant characterized “his last-minute motion to amend his witness list and offer of proof as a ‘mere formality[,]’” the record did not support this. Both the prosecution and the trial court were surprised at the contents of his “offer of proof, and both were openly convinced that it went far beyond the scope of [S’s] anticipated testimony as well as her areas of expertise. Perhaps most obviously, the prosecution clearly did not anticipate [T] providing expert testimony on the topic of forensic interviewing because it did not have an expert ready to address that topic.” The court also rejected defendant’s argument as to the trial court’s consideration of alternatives. The trial court considered (1) limiting T’s testimony to the topics discussed by S, “which could create the risk of him touching on something impermissible; (2)” excluding T’s testimony entirely, “which could drastically impair defendant’s case and prevent him from presenting a viable defense; (3) continue the trial, resuming in several weeks, which could result in the jurors ‘be[ing] inappropriately influenced by the outside world’ and potentially unavailable when trial resumed;” and (4) declaring a mistrial. After thoroughly analyzing the alternatives, it concluded that “a mistrial was the only viable option in the ‘interest [of] justice’[.]”