Violation of MCL 333.16221(a) (negligence or failure to exercise due care); Respondent-social worker’s duty to a patient; A hospital’s duty owed to a patient; Chelik v Capitol Transp, LLC; Distinguishing Oja v Kin; Whether the Board of Social Work Disciplinary Subcommittee (DSC) exceeded the scope of the complaint allegation; Due process; “Intervene”; Substantial evidence; Credibility determinations in an administrative action; Administrative law judge (ALJ)

The court concluded that the ALJ properly determined that respondent-social worker had a duty to the patient in question because respondent was working at the crisis center when the patient was assaulted by another hospital employee, and that the “DSC did not exceed the scope of the allegation in the complaint.” It further held that substantial evidence supported the DSC’s conclusion that he failed to adequately intervene in the assault on the patient. Thus, the court affirmed the DSC’s final order, which found that he violated MCL 333.16221(a) and placed him “on probation for one day to six months, contingent on the successful completion of certain continuing education requirements.” He raised several challenges to the determination as to his duty to the patient. He asserted “he did not have a ‘free-standing duty’ to protect the patient from the assault, noting that the ALJ correctly concluded that social workers do not have a broad duty to help anyone in danger. Respondent” appeared to base this argument in response to an expert’s (G) “testimony that a social worker has a duty to intervene when someone is generally in danger, such as at a grocery store. [G] later testified that respondent’s duty to intervene on the patient’s behalf arose from his employment at the hospital and from the Public Health Code. In response to this testimony, the ALJ determined that [G] ultimately arrived at ‘the correct conclusion’ that respondent’s duty to the patient arose from his employment at the hospital and from being on duty when the incident occurred. Neither the ALJ nor the DSC, which did not amend the ALJ’s description of the source of respondent’s duty, concluded that” he owed the patient a “free-standing duty.” Thus, respondent challenged “reasoning that did not form the basis of the disciplinary order.” The court also rejected his claim that substantial evidence did “not support the DSC’s conclusion that he failed to intervene adequately.” While he asserted that he successfully calmed the other employee down, it was “not accurate to say that the technician calmed down and resumed interacting normally with the patient.” The court also noted that “the disagreement between the ALJ and the DSC was not whether verbal de-escalation was sufficient, but whether respondent used verbal de-escalation.” His challenge to the DSC’s credibility determination did not provide a ground for reversal.