Plea agreement; Scope of an appellate waiver; United States v. Toth; Validity; Bradshaw v. Stumpf; Whether 18 USC § § 111(a)(1) & (b) requires “intent to cause bodily injury”; United States v. Kimes; United States v. Rafidi; United States v. Jackson (7th Cir.); United States v. Arrington (DC Cir.); United States v. Ettinger (11th Cir.); Sentencing; 18 USC § 3553(a); Gall v. United States; Procedural reasonableness; United States v. Rayyan; Substantive reasonableness; Holguin-Hernandez v. United States; United States v. Boucher; Applicability of the USSG §§ 2A2.4(b)(1)(B) & 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancements; “Dangerous weapon”; USSG § 1B1.1, comment., n.1(E); United States v. Tolbert; Molotov cocktails as dangerous weapons; Effect of an above-Guidelines sentence; United States v. Thomas; Whether this case fell in the “mine-run” of drug trafficking & assault cases; United States v. Perez-Rodriguez

In an issue of first impression, the court held that § 111(b), which proscribes using a deadly or dangerous weapon against federal officers, is a “general intent” crime. Defendant-Milliron pled guilty to several offenses arising from his initiation of a 35-mile, high-speed chase with police. During the chase, he tossed home-made incendiary devices from his mobile meth lab at the police cars before eventually crashing into a building. He was sentenced to 110 months in prison. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. On appeal, he first claimed that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in denying his motion, but the court held that he waived this issue in his guilty plea. His plea agreement contained a waiver provision, in which he waived his right to appeal the sentence or conviction. Based on this waiver, “only challenges to the validity of the plea agreement and the appeal waiver” could be considered. The court rejected his claim that the agreement was invalid because his attorney failed to inform him of an essential element of violating §§ 111(a)(1) and (b)—that he must have intended to cause bodily injury. The court disagreed, noting that § 111(a)(1) has been held to be a general intent crime. Further, it joined other circuits by holding that § 111(b) “does not contain a specific intent requirement.” Thus, the court concluded that he “was well-informed of all the essential elements” of §§ 111(a)(1) and (b), and as a result, he “knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the plea agreement and appeal waiver.” The court also rejected his reasonableness challenges to his sentences. It upheld the application of enhancements under §§ 2A2.4(b)(1)(B) and 2D1.1(b)(1) based on his use of dangerous weapons (Molotov cocktails). It further held that his sentence was not substantively unreasonable where it was above the Guideline range by 14 months. Affirmed.