Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); 29 USC § 623(a)(1); A prima facie case; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.; Scheick v. Tecumseh Pub. Schs.; Effect of Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.; Direct evidence; Materiality; Diebel v. L & H Res., LLC (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Scott v. Potter (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Indirect evidence; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; Miles v. South Cent. Human Res. Agency, Inc.; Insubordination as a non-discriminatory reason for termination; Pretext; Chen v. Dow Chem. Co.; Shifting rationales; Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc.; Disparate treatment; Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Failure to follow self-imposed procedures; White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth.

Rejecting plaintiff-Pelcha’s argument that Bostock’s reasoning “should be extended to change the meaning of ‘because of’ under the ADEA[,]” the court reaffirmed that in ADEA cases, a plaintiff must show that “age was the reason why they were terminated, not that age was one of multiple reasons.” It affirmed summary judgment for defendants on the basis that Pelcha failed to show the stated reason for her termination was a pretext for age discrimination. The stated reason for her termination was insubordination. She sued for age discrimination under the ADEA. On appeal, Pelcha first argued that the Supreme Court in Bostock (which held that Title VII sex-discrimination cases could include “terminations with multiple motivations”) changed the requirement under Gross and Scheick “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” She contended that Bostock should be applied to age-discrimination cases. But the court disagreed, holding that Bostock’s interpretation was limited to Title VII sex discrimination. Further, even if it were not, the court was required to follow the case that “directly controls” (Gross) and allow the Supreme Court “‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” The court then held that the statements Pelcha offered as direct evidence of discrimination were “infrequent” and “vague,” and were “temporally distant” from her termination. Although she offered sufficient indirect evidence to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, defendants offered a sufficient non-discriminatory reason for firing her—insubordination—and she failed to show that this was a pretext for discrimination. Considering all of the “evidence together, we find that Pelcha has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her termination was motivated by her age.”