Removal; Determination that no exceptional circumstances justified petitioner’s failure to appear at her hearing; Acquaah v. Holder; Bi Feng Liu v. Holder; Daneshvar v. Ashcroft; 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i); Recovery from childbirth as an exceptional circumstance under § 1229a(e)(1); Touvell v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities; Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs; Medical conditions; Singh v. Gonzales (9th Cir.); Yweil v. INS (7th Cir.); Effect of petitioner’s young age; In re Meja-Andino (BIA); Whether the BIA’s analysis was sufficient; Dieng v. Barr; Precetaj v. Sessions; Whether petitioner had to prove prima facie eligibility for immigration relief; In re Grijalva-Barrera (BIA); Lo v. Ashcroft (9th Cir.); Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS)

The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by denying petitioner-E.A.’s motion to reopen an in absentia removal order where she showed that “exceptional circumstances” had prevented her from appearing at her immigration hearing in another state. It also joined its sister circuits and held that she was not required to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief in order to obtain rescission under § 1229a(b)(5) of the in absentia removal order. E.A., a minor and native of El Salvador, entered the country illegally and joined her mother. She did not appear at a master-calendar hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. She moved to reopen with new representation, arguing that exceptional circumstances excused her failure to appear, including her inability to change the hearing location from Tennessee to New York after her family relocated, and her mother’s inability to drive her from New York to Memphis to attend the hearing due to recently giving birth. The IJ denied her request, and the BIA affirmed. The first issue was whether the BIA abused its discretion by determining that no exceptional circumstances justified E.A.’s failure to appear. The court held that based “on the totality of the circumstances, including E.A. mother’s recent childbirth, E.A.’s young age” (she was 13 years old at the time of the missed hearing), her “mother’s failed attempts to obtain counsel to help change the address of E.A.’s hearing, and E.A.’s inability to travel from New York to Memphis for the hearing, . . E.A. established exceptional circumstances.” It noted that childbirth “is a serious medical event that necessitates a recovery period.” The BIA minimized its seriousness “and its impact on E.A.’s mother’s ability to bring E.A. to Memphis.” In addition, E.A.’s young age contributed to its conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed, “mandating that the BIA reopen her immigration proceedings.” While a petitioner’s young age “is not a per se exceptional circumstance[,]” the court found that it was an important factor under the totality of the circumstances here. Further, the BIA’s decision was contrary to law. Among other things, it “erred by summarily dismissing without a rational explanation evidence of E.A.’s eligibility for” SIJS, and by ruling that “E.A. was required to prove prima facie eligibility for immigration relief.” The court granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and remanded.