Intoxicated-driving prosecution; Preliminary breath test (PBT) results; MCL 257.625a(2)(b); Right to present a defense; Arbitrariness; Disproportionality; MCL 257.625a(2)(b)’s alleged “conflict” with MRE 702 & 703; Whether the area in which defendant’s vehicle was stuck was, as a matter of law, “generally accessible” to motor vehicles; People v Rea; The Michigan Vehicle Code (MCL 257.1 et seq); Motion in limine to exclude evidence as to his occupation & display of his “badge”; Relevance; MRE 401, 402, & 403; Blood alcohol concentration (BAC)

In this intoxicated-driving prosecution, the court held that defendant was not deprived of the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Thus, the district court did not err when it concluded that the PBT result was inadmissible as substantive evidence under MCL 257.625a(2)(b). Also, “even to the extent that MCL 257.625a(2)(b) irreconcilably conflicts with MRE 702 and MRE 703, MCL 257.625a(2)(b) prevails.” Further, the district court did not err by holding that the area in which defendant’s vehicle was found was generally accessible to motor vehicles. Finally, his “conduct of displaying his badge and his statement whether ‘something could be done’ were relevant.” And his prearrest statement and conduct were admissible under MRE 403. Defendant argued that the district court erred when it excluded “the PBT because the application of the evidentiary statute—MCL 257.625a(2)(b)—unreasonably offends [his] [c]onstitutional right to present a complete defense.” The parties agreed that MCL 257.625a(2)(b) prohibited him from admitting his PBT result to support his rising BAC defense. The dispute was whether this statutory restriction imposed an unconstitutional impediment on his right to present a complete defense. Defendant first claimed that MCL 257.625a(2)(b)’s restrictions were arbitrary. The court held that the “Legislature has a legitimate interest in limiting collateral litigation and jury confusion concerning the result of comparatively unreliable breath tests.” In addition, when “viewed in this context, MCL 257.625a(2)(b) simply does not reflect an arbitrary exercise of a governmental authority.” Defendant next argued that MCL 257.625a(2)(b) was disproportionate because the statute’s exceptions favor the prosecution. The court failed “to see how a defendant’s ill-advised cross-examination of a government witness renders a neutral statute unconstitutionally disproportionate.” Thus, it held that MCL 257.625a(2)(b) does “not abridge [a defendant’s] right to present a defense” because it is “not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve.” Affirmed.