Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC I conviction; “Sexual penetration”; MCL 750.520a(r); People v Anderson; Jury instruction on the definition of anal opening; Exclusion of evidence of a false prior sexual assault accusation by the victim; People v Williams; Applicability of the rape-shield statute (MCL 750.520j); MRE 403

The court held that there was sufficient evidence of sexual penetration to support defendant’s CSC I conviction and that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the definition of anal opening. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of an allegedly false prior sexual assault allegation by the victim (J). Defendant was also convicted of CSC II, accosting a child for an immoral purpose, disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor, and indecent exposure. The court recently held in Anderson “that intrusion into the crease of the buttocks, but not into the anal cavity itself, is sufficient to satisfy the penetration element.” J testified in this case “that defendant pushed his penis up against her butt and that his penis went ‘[b]etween the cheeks but not like all the way in[,]’ in other words ‘not to where the poop comes out.’ She further stated that defendant then took his penis ‘out of the crack.’” Thus, this “testimony was sufficient to establish that defendant’s penis entered the crease of her buttocks,” establishing the penetration element. The court rejected his argument that Anderson was wrongly decided and it should invoke MCR 7.215(J)’s conflict resolution procedure. It also found that the trial court’s challenged jury instruction was consistent with Anderson. Finally, while the trial court erred in determining “that the rape-shield statute did not govern the admission or exclusion of defendant’s proffered evidence” about J’s prior accusation, it reached the correct result in excluding it. The trial court “primarily relied on its finding that there was no accusation, possibly because no formal criminal charges were filed.” The court noted that while “Williams suggested that the lack of criminal charges was relevant[,]” Michigan case law has not held “that formal charges are required in order for a prior false accusation of sexual conduct to be admissible.” However, the trial court was correct that defendant did not offer “sufficient proof that the accusation was even made.” Thus, it could have properly excluded this evidence based on the rape-shield statute alone. In addition, it was properly excluded under MRE 403. The probative value of a statement by J made “when she five or six years old, eight years before trial, simply did not warrant the risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.” Affirmed.