Right to an impartial jury; People v Jackson; Juror bias; MCR 2.511(D); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Gioglio (On Remand); Jury instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense; People v Cornell; Comparing CSC I & III; MCL 750.520b(1)(f) & 520d(1)(b); Principle that CSC III is a necessarily included lesser offense of CSC I; People v Mendoza; The decision to not request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense as sound trial strategy; People v Sardy; People v Nickson; Failure of a chosen defense strategy; People v Petri

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to excuse a juror for bias, and that he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC I for raping his wife. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his right to be tried by an impartial jury was violated when the trial court denied his request to disqualify a juror. In light of the juror’s “assurances that she would be fair and impartial and considering the extremely limited nature of the juror’s contact with the complainant (which consisted solely of exchanging pleasantries such as ‘hello, and how are you’ while the juror was in the check-out line),” the court was not left with a “definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred by finding the juror would be fair and impartial.” It also rejected his claim that his counsel was effective for failing to request the jury to be instructed on the lesser included offense of CSC III. Although an instruction on CSC III was available, “such an instruction was contrary to the defense that no crime had been committed. It was a reasonable trial strategy for the defense lawyer to proceed with an all-or-nothing defense as opposed to arguing to the jury that if it found nonconsensual sexual contact, it should convict of” CSC III rather than CSC I. Moreover, he “wholly failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance by his lawyer.” Affirmed.