Expert testimony; MRE 702; People v Thorpe; People v Peterson; Medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception; MRE 803(4); People v Meeboer (After Remand); Prosecutorial misconduct; Questioning of a witness

Finding no merit in defendant’s challenges to the admission of an expert’s (Dr. M) testimony, and rejecting her claims of prosecutorial misconduct in questioning M, the court affirmed her CSC I and II convictions in these consolidated appeals. It concluded that M did not vouch for the victim’s (A) “credibility either directly or impliedly.” M did not offer any opinions on the validity of A’s sexual abuse allegations, or state that A suffered such abuse, or make any “express or implied mention of defendant’s guilt.” Rather, M provided the jury with needed general information as to “child sexual abuse from which the jury could make informed determinations of fact in this case.” The court noted that M’s testimony about “the lack of physical evidence of sexual assault” supported defendant’s contention that she did not commit the charged offenses and A falsely accused her. M appropriately relied on A’s “explanation of her allegations of digital and penile penetration to guide her medical interaction with [her]. Based on A[]’s description of her allegations, [M] determined the necessity of conducting a physical examination of A[]’s genital area. [M] did not opine that the information provided to her constituted true and accurate information. Rather, she considered the information only for its diagnostic use and consideration of proper treatment.” Thus, it fell within MRE 803(4). In addition, M’s testimony about suicidal ideation was not objectionable because A had a history that M rightly considered to assess A’s ability to endure a physical exam “of her genital area so as not to inflict [her] with unnecessary and perhaps dangerous mental trauma.” M’s testimony about her knowledge of A’s “allegations of fondling also was not objectionable because the information was part of A[]’s history necessary for proper diagnosis and treatment, and the testimony generally enlightened the jury by clarifying that such conduct would not leave physical evidence of abuse or transmit sexually transmitted diseases. [M] did not testify that such conduct actually happened nor did she opine that defendant was guilty of such conduct.” The court held that M’s “testimony did not exceed the permissible limits of an expert witness in a case involving alleged sexual abuse.”