Motion for substitute counsel; People v Strickland; Sentencing; Habitual offender notice; MCL 769.13; People v Head; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to inform defendant of a plea offer; Factual predicate

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for substitute counsel, and that he failed to establish the factual predicate for his claim counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of a plea offer, the court affirmed his convictions. It also held that the prosecution’s failure to file a proof of service of its notice of intent to seek a fourth-offense habitual offender sentencing enhancement was harmless, and affirmed his sentences. He was convicted of FIP, CCW, felony-firearm, and resisting arrest. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 4 to 20 years for FIP, consecutive and subsequent to 2 years for felony-firearm, as well as concurrent terms of 4 to 20 years for CCW and 46 to 180 months for each resisting arrest conviction. As to the denial of his pretrial and day-of-trial motions for substitute counsel, the court noted that his “pretrial motion made no specific request for relief from the trial court—e.g., to appoint substitute counsel, to allow defendant to substitute retained counsel, to allow defendant to represent himself. And on the first day of trial,” he did not request that the trial court appoint him a different attorney—instead, he appeared to seek more time “to obtain substitute, retained counsel. If defendant’s statements at trial were a request for the appointment of substitute counsel,” the court found that he did not show the required good cause or “that substitution would not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process.” His stated issues with counsel were that counsel “had not visited him enough, and that he was not provided with enough ‘paperwork’ from the case to prepare for trial.” The court determined that neither of his “stated grievances was a legitimate difference of opinion over a fundamental trial tactic.” It noted that defense counsel “stated in open court that he gave defendant the police report at his preliminary” exam, and that defense counsel allowed him “to pursue his theory that the warrant for his arrest was based on a false statement.” The court added that he could not show prejudice. As to the habitual offender notice, nothing in the record indicated that he and defense “counsel were unaware of the prosecution’s intent to seek habitual offender sentencing.”