Res judicata; Tolling; The No-Fault Act’s one-year-back rule; MCL 500.3145; Presumption that statutory amendments operate prospectively; Davis v State Employees’ Ret Bd; Motion to transfer; Venue; MCL 600.1621(a)

The court reversed the trial court’s ruling dismissing plaintiff’s action based on res judicata, but affirmed its ruling that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 applied and its denial of plaintiff’s motion to transfer the case to another trial court. The court held that res judicata did not apply here. Defendant cited “no authority for the proposition that the Wayne Circuit Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(6) was an adjudication on the merits of the claims raised.” Instead, defendant argued that “because the Wayne Circuit Court’s 2014 order was an order granting summary disposition, it was a dismissal on the merits.” This argument was unpersuasive in the context of this case. “The Wayne Circuit Court did not address, let alone decide, the merits of plaintiff’s claims. Instead, it dismissed them because of the then-pending action in Kentucky. While this order may have been on ‘on the merits’ with respect to the sole question addressed by the trial court—whether another action had been initiated between the same parties involving the same claim in Kentucky—that is no longer a controlling question (or even a question) in the present case.” It was uncontested that there was “no longer a separate lawsuit involving these parties and these claims in Kentucky, and it is uncontested that the merits of plaintiff’s claims have not been resolved by a court in a prior proceeding.” Thus, res judicata did not apply to its “dismissal of the 2013 lawsuit, and the Wayne Circuit Court erred when it concluded that plaintiff’s newest lawsuit was barred under that doctrine.” But there was no merit in plaintiff’s argument that “the parties agreed to toll the one-year-back rule when the case was ‘transferred’ from Kentucky to Michigan[.]” A prior panel of the court “directed the Wayne Circuit Court to make factual findings and legal conclusions on remand.” Based on the court’s review of the record, it could “not say that the trial court’s factual conclusions on this point were clearly erroneous.” As to the one-year-back rule, the court found that it was “clear from the text of MCL 500.3145 that the Legislature did not intend the tolling provision of subsection (3) to have retroactive effect.” Plaintiff filed his case before the amendment was effective. Thus, it did not apply to his complaint. Remanded.