Habeas corpus; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to illicit certain testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception; Failure to personally interview the witness; Failure to call a weapons expert; Trial strategy; Distinguishing Hinton v. Alabama

The court held that petitioner-Kendrick was correctly denied habeas relief where the Tennessee Supreme Court properly applied federal law in holding that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to illicit testimony about a defective rifle trigger from a police witness (M) or failing to hire a firearms expert. Kendrick was convicted of first-degree murder. He asserted that his hunting rifle accidently discharged. His habeas petition alleged that the Tennessee Supreme Court mistakenly applied federal law by ruling that his trial “counsel had a reasonable basis to believe” that M (who discovered the rifle and accidently shot himself in the foot with it) would testify that “he had not touched the trigger, and that this testimony would be ‘enough for a reasonable doubt as to anything.’” On habeas review, the court concluded that counsel made several attempts to convince the jury that M’s finger was not on the trigger when he shot himself, and that even if counsel had tried to introduce M’s prior statements as excited utterances, it still would not have changed the trial’s outcome. Thus, the court held that Kendrick failed to show that the state court “‘applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.’” The court rejected his argument that his attorney should have personally interviewed M before he gave testimony to determine how he would testify at trial, holding that “the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to interview a witness personally when he reasonably believes that doing so is unnecessary.” Kendrick also argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court erred by ruling that his counsel was not deficient for failing to call a firearm expert to testify about potential defects in the rifle’s trigger. But the court agreed with the state court that “‘at the time defense counsel was forming his trial strategy, it was reasonable to anticipate that he could’” very effectively use M’s testimony to win an acquittal. It noted that even if counsel had sought an expert, “it was ‘entirely uncertain’ whether counsel would have found one in 1994 with a reasonable investigation.” Further, the court concluded that counsel made a reasonable effort to counteract the prosecution’s firearm expert. Thus, it held that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision was “‘reasonable and supported by the record.’” Affirmed.