Nominating petition requirements; MCL 168.413(1); MCL 168.544c; Whether MCL 168.544c(1) requires a candidate to list his or her residential address on nominating petitions; “Address” & “street address”; Writ of mandamus; MCR 3.305; Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Cnty v Kent Cnty Treasurer; Mootness; Barrow v Detroit Election Comm’n

The court held that the Court of Claims did not err by granting plaintiff-judicial candidate a writ of mandamus ordering defendants-Secretary of State (SOS) and Board of Canvassers (Board) to accept his nominating petitions for judicial office and ordering them to place him on the primary ballot. Plaintiff sought to run as a nonincumbent judicial circuit judge candidate. In his nominating petitions, he listed the address of his law practice and committee headquarters, not his residential address. The SOS affirmed that his nominating petitions contained accurate information, so he obtained signatures on his petitions and submitted them to the SOS. An election opponent later challenged the validity of plaintiff’s nominating petitions on the basis that he did not list his residential address where he was registered to vote. The Board found plaintiff’s nominating petitions were insufficient, and determined he could not be certified as a candidate for the primary. He filed this action and the Court of Claims ruled in his favor. On appeal, the court first found that because this appeal “presents a publicly significant issue that could arise in the future yet evade judicial review,” it would review the issue. It then rejected defendants’ argument that the Court of Claims erred by granting plaintiff mandamus relief and ordering the SOS to place him on the primary election ballot. It noted that “MCL 168.544c(1) does not specify that the address identified in . . . the nominating petition be the candidate’s residence address.” The court was “not persuaded by defendants’ arguments that the terms ‘Street Address or Rural Route’ are synonymous with ‘residence address’ or ‘residential address’ because, had the Legislature ‘intended the same meaning in both statutory provisions, it would have used the same word.’” It concluded that the Court of Claims “correctly interpreted and applied MCL 168.544c(1). The record reflects that plaintiff demonstrated his entitlement to mandamus relief. He complied with the plain language requirements of MCL 168.544c(1), and his nominating petitions were sufficient to place his name on the . . . primary ballot. Defendants, therefore, were duty bound to certify his nominating petitions and place his name on the” ballot. Affirmed.