Whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice; Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc; Whether an individual or entity is capable of committing medical malpractice; Kuznar v Raksha Corp; Accrual; MCL 600.5838a(1); “Licensed health facility or agency”; MCL 600.5838a(1)(a); “Licensed health care professional”; MCL 600.5838a(1)(b); Potter v McCleary; The Public Health Code (MCL 333.1101 et seq); The Professional Service Corporation Act; MCL 450.1285(1) (formerly MCL 450.225); Whether a nonprofit corporation can render professional services through a licensed health care professional; MCL 450.2261(6); Vicarious liability; Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers; Personal representative (PR)

Holding that the trial court did not err by granting partial summary disposition for plaintiff-PR because her claims against defendant-medical provider sounded in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice, the court affirmed. Plaintiff sued defendant after her husband died from an overdose of diabetic medication. She had administered the medication based on a conversation with defendant’s employee, a certified but unlicensed medical assistant. Plaintiff successfully moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that Count 1 of her complaint sounded in ordinary negligence because defendant was not capable of being sued for medical malpractice. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by granting the motion. It noted that “under § 5838a(1)(b), as interpreted by our Supreme Court in Potter, a plaintiff may maintain a claim against a nonprofit corporation based solely on the nonprofit corporation’s vicarious liability for the professional services of its licensed health care provider-employees.” The court explained that defendant is “incapable of independently committing medical malpractice, so plaintiff’s direct-liability claims for negligent training, supervision, selection, and retention of staff must necessarily sound in ordinary negligence.” Because defendant’s employee “is not a licensed health care professional under MCL 600.5838a(1)(b), plaintiff’s claim that” defendant was vicariously liable for her actions “sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice.” In sum, “because a claim for medical malpractice cannot accrue against [defendant] either for its direct negligence in failing to train [its employee] or its vicarious liability for her allegedly negligent actions, plaintiff’s claims raised in Count 1 of her complaint cannot sound in medical malpractice.”