Sufficiency of the evidence for a carjacking conviction; MCL 750.529a; Intent; Factors in determining whether a crime is a general-intent or specific-intent offense

Holding that carjacking under the amended current version of MCL 750.529a is a specific-intent crime and thus, the prosecution had to prove defendant intended to steal or permanently deprive the victim (a deputy, M) of his vehicle, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. This was the only conviction he challenged on appeal. The court compared the current version of the statute, as amended in 2004, with the prior version, and determined that the amended language supported its “conclusion that carjacking is a specific-intent offense because the prior statute was construed as a general-intent offense and the Legislature specifically amended MCL 750.529a to include ‘in the course of committing a larceny of a motor vehicle’ as an element of the offense.” Reviewing the elements of common-law larceny, it noted that it has “held that larceny is a specific intent crime requiring the prosecutor to prove that the defendant had the intent to steal or permanently deprive the owner of his or her property.” The Michigan Supreme Court has ruled “that the plain meaning of the phrase ‘in an attempt to commit the larceny’ applied to ‘situations in which a criminal defendant makes “an effort” or undertakes an “overt act” with an intent to deprive another person of his property, but does not achieve the deprivation of property.’” Based on MCL 750.529a’s unambiguous language, “the prosecution must establish that the defendant’s acts occurred during an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or after the commission of a larceny of a motor vehicle requiring the prosecutor to prove that the defendant had the intent to steal or permanently deprive a person of the motor vehicle.” The court further held that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred “that defendant had the intent to steal or permanently deprive [M] of the patrol vehicle.” The jury could have reasonably found that he “used force during the commission of an attempted larceny of the vehicle when he hit [M] and then ran toward the patrol vehicle and attempted to engage the gearshift. A rational trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that defendant manifested the requisite specific intention to drive off in the patrol vehicle given he attempted to put the vehicle in gear” and that he would have succeeded but for the actions of M and another officer. Affirmed.