Appointment of a PR; MCL 700.3203(1)(a); Disqualification; MCL 700.3204; Suitability; In re Redd Guardianship; In re Stan Estate; Statutory grounds for removing a PR; MCL 700.3611(2)(a); Objection to appointment of a particular PR by an “interested person”; MCL 700.3203(2)

The court held that appellant-Johnson’s “suitability” to serve as PR was properly considered pursuant to MCL 700.3203(1), and rejected her argument that the probate court abused its discretion by appointing appellee-Brooks as PR because the heir to the estate (nonparty-Cody) failed to meet his burden to show Johnson’s unsuitability. Further, it was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the probate court made a mistake in appointing Brooks” as PR for the estate. The decedent’s (Rolland) will designated Johnson to serve as PR. Brooks was Rolland’s ex-wife and Cody’s mother. After Rolland died, she helped “Cody by paying expenses related to Rolland’s house, as well as Rolland’s funeral and burial expenses.” The court rejected Johnson’s argument “that the probate court violated MCL 700.3203 and improperly imposed a ‘suitability’ requirement when appointing Brooks” as PR. It noted that her argument ignored that the priority order provided in MCL 700.3203 “applies to ‘persons who are not disqualified . . .’ MCL 700.3203(1), and that an individual may be disqualified” if a probate court finds him or her “unsuitable” in formal proceedings. Further, the court determined in Redd Guardianship “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘suitable’ as ‘fit and appropriate for [its] intended purpose,’ ‘adapted to a use or purpose,’ or ‘able/qualified.’” It further held in Stan Estate “that any statutory basis sufficient to remove a [PR] is also sufficient to support an interested person’s objection to the appointment of a” PR. The court held that a preponderance of the evidence supported the probate “court’s conclusion that Johnson was unsuitable because her appointment would come at a price of losing at least one of the estate lands that Rolland had left for Cody.” The probate court found that appointing her PR “would inherently result in Johnson committing waste because” she would have to sell one of the properties to pay her estate administration fees, while Brooks would serve without compensation, and thus, “be in a better position to preserve the property for her son, the estate recipient. And Cody wanted to continue to live on and keep the land.” The record did not leave the court “with a definite and firm conviction that the probate court made a mistake by finding Johnson unsuitable to serve as” PR because it would not be in the estate’s best interests. Affirmed.