Sentencing; Career-offender status; USSG § 4B1.1; United States v Havis; Prior conviction under MCL 333.7401 for the delivery or manufacture of a controlled substance; United States v Thomas; “Delivery”; MCL 333.7105(1); Conviction under 21 USC § 841(a)(1) for distribution of a controlled substance; “Distribute”; § 802(8) & (11); A “controlled-substance offense”; § 4B1.2(b); Special conditions for supervised release; Adequate explanations; Procedural reasonableness; Analysis of the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Whether there was a discrepancy between the conditions in the written judgment & those announced at sentencing

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] Concluding that its prior reasoning as to MCL 333.7401 applied to § 841(a)(1), the court held that defendant-Booker’s § 841(a)(1) conviction was a predicate controlled-substance offense for career-offender status under § 4B1.1. It also rejected his claims that the district court made procedural errors in addressing his arguments at sentencing, and his challenges to the special conditions of his supervised release. He pled guilty to distributing a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1) and was sentenced as a career offender to 188 months. On appeal, he argued that his prior conviction under MCL 333.7401 and his § 841(a)(1) conviction were “not valid career-offender predicates.” But he admitted Thomas foreclosed his claim as to the Michigan statute. While he suggested that the court had “not yet decided whether the federal statute qualifies as a predicate offense[,]” it concluded that its prior reasoning as “to the Michigan statute maps squarely onto” § 841(a)(1), and it had “recently rejected an identical argument about § 841(a)(1)” in an unpublished opinion. The court found that Thomas illustrated why Booker’s § 841(a)(1) conviction was a predicate controlled-substance offense. For “the same reasons that ‘delivery’ of a controlled substance under” MCL 333.7401 is such an offense, “so is ‘distribution’ of a controlled substance under” § 841(a)(1). Thus, the court held that the district court properly sentenced him as a career offender. His challenges to the special conditions on his supervised release also failed. The court found that the district court gave “a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors” and noted that there was no need for it “to tie its discussion of the sentencing factors explicitly to Booker’s supervised release conditions.” Its concerns about his recidivism risk “and the need to promote public safety formed the basis for both the prison term and the supervised release conditions it imposed, as the nature of the selected conditions” made clear. The court held that the supervised release component of his sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. It added that even if it agreed with him “that the district court’s explanation was inadequate, any error would be harmless because the record” showed why it believed each condition was necessary. Further, there was no discrepancy between the conditions in the written judgment and those announced at sentencing. Affirmed.