Prosecutorial misconduct; Alleged knowing presentation of false identification testimony; Conflicts between the testimony of different witnesses; Sufficiency of the evidence; Identity; Search & seizure; Retrieval of clothing & a cell phone at the hospital where defendant was treated after the shooting; Harmless error; Cell phone records obtained pursuant to a court order instead of a search warrant; Motion to suppress based on Carpenter v United States; The Stored Communication Act; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Stipulating to allow a witness to provide cell phone data testimony; Factual predicate; Failure to retain an expert; Failure to object; Whether the trial court should have ordered a new trial based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate & raise an alibi defense

The court concluded that an eyewitness’s (W) mistake about who approached her did not equate to the prosecution presenting false testimony, and that there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s identification as the shooter to support his convictions. Further, the admission of his clothing and a cell phone retrieved from a hospital was harmless error, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress his cell phone records on the basis they were obtained pursuant to a court order rather than a search warrant. The court also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and upheld the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial after a Ginther hearing. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, AWIM, CCW, and felony-firearm. The court noted that there was no indication W testified falsely. It appeared, given other witnesses’ testimony, that she was “mistaken that, after defendant left the barbershop, he approached her for a ride to the hospital.” Rather, it appeared to have been another man who did so as defendant left the scene in another vehicle. W testified that she initially had no intention of testifying as she “lived by the ‘street code’ that what occurred was none of her business,” but changed her mind after being contacted by a relative who knew the victim’s family. She was able to describe defendant’s appearance, and the jury was entitled to find that she positively identified him “as the shooter in light of the fact that he stopped immediately in front of her, pulled a gun, and began firing.” As to the failure to obtain a warrant for the clothing and cell phone, the court noted that these items “were not the pivotal evidence that secured defendant’s convictions.” W’s identification of him “as the shooter, the testimony that the victim fired his weapon back at his assailant, the testimony by eyewitnesses that defendant was injured as he fled the barbershop and bled from his side, defendant’s presence at his employer’s home shortly after the shooting and the home’s proximity to the barbershop (regardless of any cell phone data), the vehicle and defendant’s arrival at the hospital that” was preserved on video, together with his “need for medical treatment for a gunshot wound were the key pieces of evidence that resulted in” his convictions. Affirmed.