Divorce; Property division; DeMay v DeMay; Sparks v Sparks; Valuation; Olson v Olson; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Loutts v Loutts; Consideration of a spouse’s unexercised ability to earn if income is voluntarily reduced to avoid paying alimony; Knowles v Knowles; Principle that a spouse is not required to liquidate property awarded to meet daily needs when spousal support can be made available; Gates v Gates; Harmless error; MCR 2.613(A)

The court held that the trial court did not err in its property division and spousal support determinations. The parties divorced after 30 years of marriage. The trial court found that a 55/45 split of the marital estate, and an award of spousal support for plaintiff-ex-wife, were appropriate. The court rejected defendant-ex-husband’s argument that the trial court erred because it relied on DeMay. Contrary to his “argument, DeMay does not allow a trial court to divide marital property on the basis of a party’s unfounded hopes.” As such, “plaintiff’s intent to purchase waterfront property reflected her standard of living and established plan for retirement rather than a baseless wish.” In addition, the record supported the “finding that defendant’s long-term infidelity caused the breakdown of the marriage, and the trial court did not place undue emphasis on this factor.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court made erroneous findings as to his “earning ability, possibility of promotion, and the income potential and value of” the parties’ lake property, which he received by stipulation. “Given the absence of evidence supporting defendant’s claims that his most recent annual income was not representative of what he will make in the future,” it did not err in this regard. While it did err “by relying on his eligibility for a promotion in evaluating the property division and spousal support” factors, it was not reversible error as the trial court did not actually impute income to him. As to his contention it erred by finding the lake property was income producing, there were “no grounds to conclude that the [trial] court’s limited reference to the income producing potential of the . . . property requires reversal, particularly when [it] did not impute a particular amount of income to defendant from the property and it acknowledged [his] testimony that he would no longer rent out the cabin.” There was also no error in finding an “appraisal was somewhat reliable and averaging the value of” two appraisals. The court further rejected his argument that the property division was “grossly excessive and impermissibly punitive” because the equalization payment required him to raise substantial cash from his real estate and retirement account, finding he “had ample assets to sell or mortgage that would enable him to afford” the payment. Finally, given “the length of the marriage, defendant’s fault in causing the divorce, the substantial discrepancy in the parties’ earning abilities, and plaintiff’s needs,” the award of $5,000 a month until he turns 65, and $1,500 a month after, was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.