Sentencing; First Step Act § 403(b); 18 USC § 924(c); Entitlement to resentencing under the Act; Whether a sentence was “imposed” before the Act was enacted; United States v. Richardson; United States v. Henry

The court vacated defendant-Jackson’s sentence and remanded for the district court to sentence him under the version of § 924(c) that pre-dates the First Step Act. A jury convicted him of carjacking and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He had been sentenced and his appeal was pending when Congress enacted the First Step Act. The court later vacated one of his brandishing convictions and remanded for resentencing. The district court ruled that Jackson was eligible for consideration under the Act but still increased his sentence by 21 months. Jackson appealed the increase, and the government appealed the district court’s conclusion that he was eligible for sentencing under the Act. The court first noted that the Act provides that it applies to “a defendant on whom ‘a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of’” 12/21/18. It then considered when a sentence is “imposed,” and concluded that it must consider his status on the 12/21 date. “On the relevant date for retroactivity, Jackson was . . . under sentence pending appeal.” The court held that just because it “later vacated his first sentence does not alter Jackson’s status on the day the First Step Act became law.” It rejected the argument that the “First Step Act’s amendments should apply to all resentencing hearings that occur after the date of enactment based on the general ‘principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision[,]’” holding that the general principle argument only applies “when there is no statutory directive to the contrary.”