Divorce; Claim that the property division & spousal support award considered together constituted an impermissible “double dip”; Loutts v Loutts; Sparks v Sparks; Olson v Olson; Child support; Whether income should have been imputed to a party; Attorney fees

Concluding that it was unclear from the record “whether the trial court engaged in an inequitable ‘double-dip,’” the court found that remand was necessary as to the property division and spousal support award. It also remanded as to attorney fees. But it rejected defendant-ex-husband’s claim that the trial court should have imputed income to plaintiff-ex-wife related to calculating child support. The trial court awarded the parties their respective businesses, “estimating the value of plaintiff’s business at $9,500 and the value of defendant’s business” (Fortified Coatings) at $302,000. In addition, it ordered defendant to pay $1,666 a month in spousal support for 5 years and to pay the balance of a credit card. It referred the issue of child support to the FOC with the provision that plaintiff’s income was “nominal” and defendant’s income was $75,000. While it “apparently accepted the expert evaluator’s testimony by valuing Fortified Coatings at $302,000, the trial court did not explain how it calculated spousal support.” Because it failed to make factual findings on “the relevant factors outlined in Sparks or Olson, or make findings concerning what was just and reasonable under the circumstances,” the court could not determine the equity of its decision. “On remand, the trial court must consider the relevant factors as they pertain to the parties and make specific findings of fact that justify the court’s ultimate award of spousal support and division of property.” It must also make specific factual findings as to the value of plaintiff’s business. In addition, specific findings were needed as to whether she should be required to refinance the mortgage on the marital home in her name. Further, while the trial court ordered that each party was responsible for their own attorney fees, it ordered that defendant was responsible for the balance on a credit card that plaintiff had used to pay her attorney. As it was “unclear whether the order for defendant to pay the entirety of the card’s balance also encompassed plaintiff’s attorney fees,” the court vacated the portion of the order and the judgment requiring him to pay the balance of the card. “On remand, the trial court shall determine whether the parties shall continue to be responsible for payment of their own attorney fees and calculate the payment of the . . . credit card consistent with that determination.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.