Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Jurisdiction; Whether the no-contest plea constituted a violation of due process; Distinguishing In re Ferranti & In re Pederson; MCR 3.971(B)(4); Children’s best interests; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown

The court concluded that respondent-mother’s no-contest plea was not a violation of due process, and “because any deviation that occurred did not affect” her substantial rights, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the plea. Also, clear and convincing evidence established § (c)(i), and termination was in the children’s best interests. Finally, the reunification efforts made were more than reasonable and consistent with the principles espoused in Hicks/Brown. She challenged the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction, claiming that it was based on a defective plea. Relying on Ferranti, she contended that “her due-process rights were violated because contrary to MCR 3.971(B)(4), she was not expressly advised that a consequence of her no-contest plea was that it could be used against respondent in later proceedings to terminate her parental rights.” Respondent also asserted “that her plea was induced by the false promise that her two older children would be returned to her care if she entered the plea.” The court distinguished from Ferranti and Pederson “in that respondent here was advised that her no-contest plea would be used for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction and providing the court with a basis to order her to participate in services.” Thus, the court held that “the adjudication was not tainted because of a failure to comply with MCR 3.971(B)(4); respondent’s plea was not rendered unknowing and involuntary.” Moreover, while in Ferranti and Pederson “the parents entered pleas admitting certain allegations that they had neglected their children, respondent did not contest such allegations but in no way admitted them.” The court noted that when the trial court denied her motion to withdraw the no-contest plea, it “indicated that it accepted the plea solely for purposes of adjudication and that there was nothing from the no-contest plea to use against respondent at the termination hearing because she made no statement under oath. And to the extent that the no-contest plea could have potentially and theoretically been used against respondent by the trial court at the termination hearing,” the trial court did not do so. Under the circumstances, her no-contest plea did not constitute a violation of due process.