Quiet title; The General Property Tax Act (GPTA); The proper categorization of what defendant referred to as its “right of reverter” & whether the property interest is synonymous with a “private deed restriction”; "Restrictive covenant"

The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of plaintiff in this quiet title claim. The appeal arose from a dispute over ownership of a vacant lot in defendant-city. The parties agreed that MCL 211.78k(5)(e) precluded “defendant from obtaining the property if the language in the 2004 quit claim deed bestowed on defendant a right of reverter and not a private deed restriction.” Thus, defendant argued the trial court erred by holding that its “retention of an interest in the land constituted a right of reverter but did not create a private deed restriction.” At issue was the proper categorization of what defendant referred to as its “right of reverter” and whether the property interest is synonymous with a private deed restriction. By reviewing the definitions of a right of entry and a private deed restriction it became clear that they are two separate and distinct types of property interests. If the court “were to adopt defendant’s definition of a private deed restriction, we would effectively nullify MCL 211.78k(5)(b).” Reading the "phrase ‘private deed restriction’ in MCL 211.78k(5)(e) to refer to a right of entry would be inconsistent with the phrase’s plain meaning as reading it this way would nullify MCL 211.78k(5)(b) and would impede the object of the GPTA.” Thus, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition and denied defendant’s motion. After the Oakland County Treasurer obtained a judgment of foreclosure against the vacant lot, “fee simple title to the property vest[ed] absolutely in” the Oakland County Treasurer. At that point “all existing recorded and unrecorded interests in that property [were] extinguished,” including defendant’s right of entry. Thus, when the Oakland County Treasurer sold the lot to plaintiff in 10/07, fee simple absolute title passed to plaintiff.