Restitution; Whether the general restitution statute (MCL 769.1a) conflicts with the misdemeanor restitution statute (MCL 780.826); People v Garrison; Misdemeanors under the Crime Victim’s Rights Act; The “criminal activity” exception; MCL 780.752(3); Whether a moving violation causing death under MCL 257.601d(1) is a civil infraction, a crime, or a misdemeanor; MCL 780.811(1)(a)(i)-(xvii); “Defendant”; MCL 780.811(1)(c); “Victim”; “Misdemeanor”; MCL 780.826(1)(a); “Serious misdemeanor”; MCL 780.766; Waiver; People v Bragg

Holding that the prosecution did not waive its restitution claim, but that only the general restitution statute applied, the court reversed and remanded. Defendant pled no contest to a moving violation causing death after she turned left at an intersection and struck the victim, a motorcyclist. The prosecution sought restitution on behalf of his estate. The district court found that the victim’s operation of his motorcycle without an endorsement barred a restitution award. The circuit court ruled that the prosecution waived its restitution claim. On appeal, the court found that the circuit court erred by determining that the prosecution waived its restitution claim. “The district court referenced MCL 780.752, a felony restitution statute, and the prosecutor agreed with the district court’s interpretation of that statute. But the prosecution’s restitution argument focused on the general and misdemeanor restitution statutes, and not the felony statute. The prosecutor’s agreement with the district court regarding an inapplicable statute did not constitute a waiver of restitution arguments premised on other statutory provisions.” The court next found that the plain language of the misdemeanor restitution statute precluded its application to defendant “because she was charged with and convicted of a nonserious misdemeanor.” However, the general restitution statute remained applicable “because the two restitution statutes are readily reconcilable and represent alternative routes to restitution orders.” Because defendant was charged with and convicted of “a moving violation causing death and that offense does not qualify as a ‘serious misdemeanor,’ [she] was not a ‘defendant’ for purposes of the payment of restitution under MCL 780.826.” However, as a “defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, she is liable for restitution under MCL 769.1a, the general restitution statute.” Finally, it found no irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes. It noted that while the provisions of the statutes “differ regarding the types of misdemeanors for which restitution must be ordered,” it found “no reason that they cannot harmoniously coexist.” In addition, “[a]pplying the general restitution statute under the circumstances of this case fulfills constitutional goals.” The court also noted that “the general restitution statute does not authorize trebling damages, perhaps reflecting legislative recognition that in a nonserious misdemeanor case this penalty might be disproportionate.”