Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii) & (j); In re JK; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) & (c); MCL 712A.19a(2); MCL 712A.19f(1), (2), & (4); In re Hicks/Brown; Due process; Right to a meaningful hearing; In re Rood; Timing; MCL 712A.19(3); Best interests of the child; In re Olive/Metts Minors

Holding that reasonable reunification efforts were made, that there was no due process violation, that at least one statutory ground was met, and that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights. It rejected respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to order reasonable efforts before the initial termination hearing. After the trial court concluded that the DHHS failed to meet its initial burden as to a statutory ground, it “ordered the DHHS to initiate a case service plan and offer reasonable efforts to reunify the family.” In addition, her “blanket denial that the services offered were insufficient in light of her intellectual disability, without identifying any services that would have been appropriate in light of such disability or how the services that were offered were deficient,” did not establish error or prejudice. Further, “[g]iven the circumstances of the pandemic and the child’s health issues, video conferencing, photos, and videos were the only realistic way to continue forming a bond with the child, albeit not the best way. Still, mother’s refusal to engage in those activities for the first couple months of the pandemic does not amount to a failure by the DHHS to facilitate the development of a bond.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court violated her due-process rights by not scheduling timely hearings, noting that any delay between hearings “can be attributed to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic and not to the trial court.” Moreover, the DHHS’s delay in filing a termination petition “actually provided more opportunity to mother to engage in services, benefit from services, and continue supervised parenting visits (albeit virtual) that she would have otherwise lost out on had the petition been timely filed . . . ." The court next rejected her contention that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. “As the trial court concluded, ‘[I]t just does not seem likely that these issues will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the age of the child.’ Mother repeatedly directs us to her consistent participation in services, but she fails to realize that she must ‘demonstrate that [she] sufficiently benefited from the services provided,’ of which there was insufficient evidence.” It also found that a “preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.” Finally, the court rejected respondent-father’s argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination, noting his “lack of insight or knowledge on how to properly parent the child causes a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to father’s care.”