e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 75873
Opinion Date : 07/15/2021
e-Journal Date : 07/29/2021
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Walker v. Hela Mgmt., LLC
Practice Area(s) : Negligence & Intentional Tort
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – M.J. Kelly and Shapiro; Concurring in the result only – Riordan
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Issues:

Premises liability; MCL 554.139 (landlord’s duty to keep premises in reasonable repair); Mullen v Zerfas; “Licensee”

Summary

Holding that plaintiff was not a “licensee” as that term is used in MCL 554.139, and that the trial court properly determined that she did not have a cause of action under MCL 554.139, the court affirmed. She stepped on a broken piece of tile and fell down the basement stairs in an apartment owned by defendant-The D Portfolio and managed by defendant-Hela Management. Plaintiff claimed that “she should be considered a tenant considering the evidence that defendants or their agent knew that she was residing in the apartment.” Specifically, she was “the only contact person for negotiating and entering the lease, she met with defendants’ representatives at the rental home to tour it, and she communicated with defendants on maintenance requests at the rental home after she had moved into it and during her tenancy.” Defendants disputed that she was a tenant but, even if she was, they contended that she was not a party to the lease and thus, was not a “contracting party” under Mullen. It bore mentioning that the plaintiff in Mullen “was a true social guest rather than a residential family member. Further, MCL 554.139 makes no mention of ‘contracting parties,’ and the Supreme Court did not expressly consider in its peremptory order that the statute is to be liberally construed. And Mullen’s interpretation of the statute suggests that landlords owe no duty under MCL 554.139 to any members of the lessee’s resident family, including children, who are incapable of contracting.” It was not clear to the court that “this was the intent of the Legislature and, were we considering the statute on a blank slate, we might reach a different result.” The slate was not blank, however, and the court held that it was “bound by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the statute applies only to ‘contracting parties’ to the lease, which plaintiff indisputably was not.” Regardless whether or not she met the definition of a tenant, she “did not have any contractual duties to defendants; if the amount owed for the rental home was not paid, defendants had no right to collect that payment from plaintiff. Likewise, plaintiff did not have any contractual rights under the lease agreement; for instance, plaintiff had no right to claim a deposit paid for the rental home. There was also no consideration between plaintiff and defendants for plaintiff to reside in or use the" home. Even assuming that they knew she was residing there, "they had not entered into an agreement with her such that plaintiff could be considered a contracting party.”

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