Sentencing; Indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person (MCL 750.335a); Conflict between the “1 day to life” sentence in § 335a(2)(c) of the Penal Code & the sentence in §§ 16q and 62 of the guidelines in the Criminal Code of Procedure; The “Title-Object” & “Reenact-Publish” Clauses of the Michigan Constitution

Holding that “the guidelines do not create an alternative sentence that can be imposed instead of the ‘1 day to life’ sentence in § 335a(2)(c)[,]” the court concluded that defendants found guilty of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person can be sentenced to the penalties in § 335a as well as “any applicable enhancements, as discussed in” its opinion in a prior decision involving this defendant, Arnold I. Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for resentencing. In Arnold I, the court determined that a person convicted under § 335a(2) “could be sentenced either to a nonmodifiable term of ‘1 day to life’ or to the other applicable statutory penalties established by that statute. However, according to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation on remand, such a person would also have to examine MCL 777.16q and MCL 777.62 . . . because the guidelines purport to apply to individuals in defendant’s circumstances and suggest that he could face a radically different penalty—imprisonment for life or any term of years.” The court noted that it had previously declined to decide whether the guidelines or § 335a applied in such circumstances. Confronting “the clear conflict between the ‘1 day to life’ sentence in § 335a(2)(c) of the Penal Code and the sentence in §§ 16q and 62 of the guidelines[,]” the court concluded that defendants “convicted of an indecent-exposure offense under § 335a as sexually delinquent persons must be sentenced pursuant to the penalties prescribed in that statute as described in” its earlier opinion. The court noted that a determination “that §§ 16q and 62 are not substantive penalty provisions” was supported by case law from across the country. Given that §§ 16q and 62 could not “be read to authorize sentence ranges that serve as an alternative to the penalty laid out in § 335a(2)(c)[,]” it followed that “the reference in § 16q to § 335a(2)(c) is nugatory and that § 62 . . . does not apply to individuals found guilty under § 335a(2)(c).” The court held that a “court may impose (1) the applicable penalty laid out in § 335a(2)(a) or (b), along with any applicable sentence enhancements or (2) the ‘1 day to life’ sentence in § 335a(2)(c).” Defendant’s sentence was “not to either of these options.” In light of the court’s ruling that the guidelines were inapplicable, he was entitled to resentencing.

Concurring in the judgment vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing, Justice Clement (joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justice Cavanagh) agreed with the majority’s result – “defendant must either be given a term-of-years sentence under MCL 750.335a(2)(b), or a ‘1 day to life’ sentence under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Because his sentence of 25 to 70 years in prison exceeds the permissible term of years sentence authorized by MCL 750.335a(2)(b) (as potentially enhanced by being a fourth-offense habitual offender,”), it was invalid. But they found a constitutional objection “to the effect of MCL 777.16q on the meaning of MCL 750.335a a more compelling rationale for negating the expressed intent of the Legislature than the majority’s explanation.”