e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 76000
Opinion Date : 08/12/2021
e-Journal Date : 08/23/2021
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Estate of Zilka v. Zilka
Practice Area(s) : Family Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Riordan, Markey, and Swartzle
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Divorce; Division of marital assets; Sparks v Sparks; MCL 552.19 & 552.401; Attorney fees

Summary

Although the trial court made errors, the court was “not left with a firm conviction that the division of the marital assets was unfair or inequitable under all” the circumstances such that reversal was warranted. Plaintiff, the estate of the now deceased ex-wife (Judy), argued that the property division was not fair and equitable. On cross-appeal, defendant-ex-husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate. The trial court’s division “was essentially fashioned around providing Judy with just enough assets to keep her afloat and in good care until her soon-to-be-expected death, instead of simply dividing the marital estate as if Judy were like any other litigant.” The court concluded that her “terminal illness should not have played such a significant role in the distribution of the parties’ property. The first mistake the trial court made was to factor into the property-division equation the $100,000 life insurance policy. There was no evidence that the policy had a cash value, and the court clearly viewed the award of the policy to Judy as being comparable to a $100,000 distribution to her as far as balancing the equities for purposes of dividing the marital estate. But this was not a distribution to Judy; it was effectively a distribution to her heirs or any named beneficiaries.” Further, the court found that “awarding life estate interests in real and personal property because Judy had a terminal disease was, at a minimum, questionable.” While the court’s ruling was “not to be interpreted as prohibiting an award of a life estate interest, it should be done sparingly in the context of divorce judgments.” Next, there was validity to defendant’s claim of a “double payment” as to the value of the life estate interest. As to attorney fees, the trial court erred in not complying with MCR 3.206(D). But the court held that substantial justice did not demand that it reverse the divorce judgment “despite the various errors and otherwise problematic aspects of the trial court’s findings and rulings.” As to the life insurance policy, reversing that award and remanding the case would result in “a nonsensical exercise and a waste of judicial resources.” The court also saw no point in reversing and undoing the life estate and remainderman interest awards under the circumstances because it was “not necessary to do so for purposes of reaching a fair and equitable resolution.” Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion